The X100 protocol, operating on the Ethereum blockchain, has fallen victim to a targeted attack on its governance mechanism. The attackers managed to withdraw approximately $4.7 million in stablecoins, exploiting a vulnerability in the project's voting system.
According to on-chain data analysis, the attackers used smart contracts to seize two of three seats in X100's governing "Senate." Having gained control over the majority of votes, they forced the protocol's treasury to sell X tokens through a liquidity pool they controlled — essentially artificially setting the terms of the deal.
Mechanics of the Withdrawal
The stablecoins obtained were converted into ETH and distributed among four wallets — 400 ETH each. Additionally, about 560,000 X tokens remained on the attackers' addresses.
Notably, after the main attack, other participants also joined in withdrawing funds from the protocol — likely taking advantage of the resulting panic and the disruption of normal liquidity mechanisms.
The incident once again exposes a fundamental problem of DeFi protocols with on-chain governance: the concentration of power in the hands of a small number of voting entities creates a critical point of failure. The attack on X100's "Senate" is not a hack of code in the classical sense, but an exploitation of architectural design, where control over votes is equivalent to control over treasury assets.
Cryptalist analysis: The X100 case illustrates the systemic risk of governance mechanisms, where a two-of-three voting threshold proves to be insufficient protection in the absence of time delays and multi-layered verification of treasury transactions. For institutional investors, this is a signal to reconsider the assessment of protocols with a high concentration of governance rights and to require the presence of circuit breakers and timelocks on critical operations.