Crypto influencer and trader DMC (Crypto Wala Dost) has publicly accused Trust Wallet of hacking and misleading users. According to his claim, 915.4957 USDT left his wallet without his involvement, and suspicious transactions to similar addresses appeared in his transaction history.
What happened
On October 22, the Trust Wallet team stated that it was aware of a recently disclosed vulnerability in PHP, but emphasized that the wallet apps and the core infrastructure of the service do not use PHP, so users were not affected and no action was required from them.
In response, DMC called the wallet's representatives liars and claimed that Trust Wallet had been hacked. However, the trader did not explain the specific connection between the PHP vulnerability and his own loss.
Transaction details
The transfer went through on the BNB Smart Chain on October 26 — four days after the company's statement. According to a screenshot from Trust Wallet, 915.4957 USDT left the wallet, which at that time amounted to about $914. The network fee was 0.00000163 BNB, less than a cent. The recipient was an address starting with 0x7c979aEC and ending with 9aF80fcEf. The data is confirmed by the BscScan explorer; the transaction completed successfully (hash 0x31ca896a1a6398af5b8db714a990ee024f351bea5198c042a44e6789b8ce44de).
On BscScan, the sender is listed as the trader's own address, and the transaction called the USDT token contract. In other words, this is an ordinary transfer signed with his wallet's key. A debit via an old approval that the user once granted to a website or app would look different — such a transaction would be sent by someone else's address.
In the Trust Wallet history, this transfer is marked as a transaction with real USDT. It is followed by six identical outgoing transactions of 915.4957 USDT — three on the same day and three more later. The recipient addresses start with the same characters 0x7c97 but differ in the last digits. This resembles a well-known scammer technique — "address poisoning": the victim's wallet history is flooded with transfers of fake tokens to similar addresses so that the next time they copy an address, they pick the wrong one.
Why the trader blames the service, not himself
DMC emphasized that he kept the wallet only on a single iPhone, never shared the seed phrase or private key with anyone, and never connected the wallet to any website. His second argument is the activity of the recipient address: it received several dozen transfers in various amounts, from very small to several thousand. Among them, the trader noted his 915 USDT. Some of the funds moved further — an outgoing transfer of 3,179.84 USDT to the address 0xc1d13492…c6318a1b5 was recorded. This is a verified smart contract with more than 10,000 transfers and a balance of 145,821 USDT (about $145,637).
It is from this data that DMC derived the figure of $100,000 in stolen funds. He provided no evidence of a hack of Trust Wallet's infrastructure itself: the screenshots confirm the fact of the transfer and the activity of the recipient address, but do not explain how the attacker gained access to the wallet.
Community reaction
Opinions under the post were divided. Some commenters did not believe the service was hacked, reminding that Trust Wallet is a non-custodial wallet and keys are stored only by the owner. Skeptics offered more likely explanations: an old approval for a website or app, a leaked seed phrase backup, correspondence with fake support, "address poisoning," hacking of the phone itself, or an attempt to swap a scam token from an airdrop. DMC countered that he has no active approvals, his phone and keys are fine, and he has already submitted the BSC transaction history.
Several people reported that their Trust Wallet wallets were also drained — amounts ranging from $500 to $9,900. The common complaint is the same: support did not respond or did not help. Owners of other wallets also recalled similar cases — Phantom, the Uniswap app, and the Samsung wallet.
Cryptalist analysis: The incident primarily points to the risks of users' operational hygiene rather than to a compromise of a non-custodial wallet's infrastructure: the transaction structure corresponds to an ordinary transfer signed by the owner's key. At the same time, the volume of complaints requires independent verification — if the losses prove to be systemic, this could increase reputational pressure on the self-custody segment and push users toward stricter approval management and hardware key storage.