Animated stickers in Telegram could be used as a hidden attack vector against smartphones. The device owner did not need to perform a single action — the malicious code was launched automatically the moment the message was received.

The messenger's animated stickers are built on the TGS format, which is based on Lottie technology. Instead of a static image, such a file is a set of commands that the rlottie rendering library uses to build an animation on the screen. When a sticker arrives in a chat, the app processes it on its own to display a preview — and it was precisely at this stage that a specially crafted file could initiate the execution of foreign code.

From a single bug — to a chain of exploits

Research in the field of low-level security revealed a series of memory-handling bugs in the rlottie library that affected Telegram clients for iOS, Android, and desktop computers. Automated testing involving language models was used to find the vulnerabilities: the system generated many unusual and corrupted animation variants, fed them to the library, and recorded crashes. Some of these crashes made it possible not only to bring down the app but also to interfere with code execution. Certain logic flaws in sticker delivery and verification were combined into a chain and the attack was driven all the way to code execution in the iOS version of Telegram.

Earlier this year, a vulnerability in sticker processing was identified by specialists from a security research unit associated with Trend Micro. The flaw was initially assigned an almost maximum danger score — 9.8 out of 10 — and was later lowered to 7.0. The basis for this was Telegram's arguments about server-side protection: the company claimed that every sticker is checked on its servers before reaching users, meaning a malicious file would supposedly never reach the vulnerable code.

The new research struck directly at this claim. It was shown that server-side and client-side restrictions can be bypassed, and code that was "on paper" unreachable once again becomes a real target. This raised an uncomfortable question: the ability to run code on someone else's device without the owner's action, fully controlled by the messenger itself, can be interpreted as a protective measure, as an architectural risk, and as something close to a backdoor — a hidden access channel.

Replacing the engine as the answer

In the end, Telegram went beyond server-side filtering: the vulnerable code is no longer present in its clients. The company replaced the rlottie rendering library with a new one written in the Rust language. This language makes typical memory-handling bugs harder to introduce, and the tool itself is designed from the outset to treat stickers as untrusted files.

For the crypto community, this case remains an important lesson. Telegram is one of the key communication channels for traders, projects, and wallet-related bots, and an attack via a sticker requires no action from the victim. Simple steps help protect against it: update the app promptly and limit the circle of those who can message you first. This can be done in Telegram's settings, in the "Messages" section, by allowing incoming messages only from saved contacts.

Cryptalist analysis: The incident demonstrates that the security of messenger infrastructure directly affects the operational risks of crypto participants who use Telegram to manage assets and interact with bots. The switch to Rust reduces the class of memory-safety vulnerabilities, but the very principle of automatically processing untrusted content remains an area of heightened attention. For institutional players, this is an argument in favor of strict update hygiene and segmentation of communication channels.