The largest hack in Binance's history, totaling $6.34 billion, was the result not of sophisticated hacking technologies, but of three basic operational security mistakes that could have been eliminated at almost no cost. This is evidenced by a detailed breakdown of the exchange's incident investigation report.

Three mistakes that could have been avoided

The analysis identified three critical weak points, each of which relates to fundamental cybersecurity rules rather than costly technical solutions:

  1. Employees' work computers were not isolated from the systems managing funds. An employee with access to money should work on a separate machine without unnecessary software — code, chats, and the browser should be on another device. At Binance, everything was different: the attack began when an engineer downloaded an infected file from a fake recruiter onto his work machine.
  2. Weak access protection. A single key was enough to manage the exchange's systems. When the key leaked, the hackers gained full control. The solution is to add a second factor, such as a hardware key, after which a single stolen password gives nothing.
  3. Multisignature existed only on paper. The point of multisignature is that transferring funds requires the consent of multiple parties. If one node is compromised, the others should stop a suspicious transaction. But at Binance, the parties checked nothing and signed everything indiscriminately — the compromise of a single node brought down the entire scheme.

Timeline of the attack and Binance's version

The attack was prepared over several months. In June, an engineer downloaded an infected installer while searching for an AI coding tool — the device was replaced, but the hackers figured out who was responsible for the exchange's wallets. In September, another engineer was found through a job search site: he was put through two video "interviews," and at the end was asked to download a "test assignment" containing a virus that the antivirus did not detect. In October, through the infected computer, the hackers reached Binance's internal AI tool and gained access to the machines of two more engineers — one of them held the access key to the exchange's systems. On October 29, this key was used and the withdrawal of funds was initiated.

Within minutes, 233.46 million XRP, about 970,500 SOL, 44.2 million OP, and 18,270 BTC were withdrawn from the wallets. The hackers then used the EIP-7702 mechanism in Ethereum, which allows transferring some wallet rights to a smart contract. Disabling withdrawals did not help: the permissions lived on the blockchain and operated on their own. They could not be revoked quickly — due to the multisignature scheme, there was no single key for this, and the team had to develop a separate procedure while the attack continued for several hours.

According to the FBI, North Korea is behind the hack. In 2026, Binance repelled 57 similar attacks from North Korea. The exchange promised to cover the losses itself: it reserved more than 100% of the required amount, and 98% of the stolen assets have already been replenished. About $2.85 billion was frozen. Binance rebuilt its wallet system, replaced devices, revoked keys, and engaged independent auditors. The report showed: the main threat is not hacking tools, but the human factor and a lack of discipline.

Cryptalist analysis: The incident confirms that the largest losses in the crypto industry arise not from protocol exploits, but from failures in operational hygiene and social engineering. For institutional participants, this is a signal to review infrastructure isolation, mandatory multisignature with real transaction verification, and staff training. The market should expect stricter requirements from regulators and auditors regarding custodial storage practices.