Comparisons of Russia with North Korea are increasingly heard in comments under posts, in bloggers' videos, and in everyday conversations. The reason was the restrictions faced by residents of the Russian Federation. Cryptalist examined three categories of barriers — the internet, freedom of speech, and money — and assessed how much such parallels reflect reality.
The comparisons rest on three groups of restrictions: blocks and whitelists on the internet, pressure on freedom of speech and access to information, and tightening conditions in the banking system. An examination of each shows that similarities exist, but the methods of the two states are fundamentally different.
1. The Internet
In the DPRK there is no worldwide network. The country's internal network operates, logically isolated and fully closed within state borders. There is no physical connection to the global web and never has been — all sites are located within the North Korean network itself. A DPRK resident who gets to a computer will not open YouTube even with the most powerful VPN.
Whitelists are not needed there: the authorities simply have nothing to block — everything available on the local network has already passed censorship.
In Russia the picture is different. There is no complete disconnection from the global network; the physical connection between the internal network and the external one is preserved. Whitelists are applied selectively, but many residents of the Russian Federation live with a VPN constantly turned on. The authorities call this a forced measure for security purposes. Experts differ in their assessments: some allow the comparison with caveats, noting that Russia has introduced mechanisms analogous to North Korean ones but has not moved to full isolation. Others point to a deep fundamental difference: the DPRK is a spaceship with a closed system inside the hull, while Russia is a tank moving through contaminated terrain, where air comes in from outside but only through filters.
2. Freedom of Speech and Access to Information
The DPRK's closed nature has two explanations: the authorities' fear of the spread of information about the outside world and the desire to make it difficult to transmit information about themselves abroad. The mechanisms are simple: the export of any mobile devices is prohibited, devices that end up abroad are smuggled out, and when such smartphones are disassembled, South Korean words are automatically replaced with North Korean variants. A separate cellular network operates for foreigners — one can call abroad, but one cannot reach an ordinary North Korean number.
In Russia, Article 29 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought, speech, and mass media and directly prohibits censorship. Taking equipment out is still possible, but access to data is becoming more difficult over time. Blocks on social networks and messengers are compensated for by VPNs. There are penalties for violating laws in the Russian Federation, but they are incomparable to North Korean ones.
3. Money
The DPRK's financial system is outside the global banking infrastructure: there is no working integration with SWIFT, nor stable correspondent relationships. Settlements go through North Korean compliance, multi-stage schemes with third countries, or barter. Russia is also cut off from SWIFT, but not hopelessly: a number of small credit institutions still conduct international transfers. Cryptocurrency has become a legal tool for the Russian Federation to compensate business losses, whereas Pyongyang uses it differently — through hacker groups that, over ten months of 2026, according to BitOK estimates, stole $7.61 billion, directing the funds, among other things, to the development of nuclear and missile programs.
Cryptalist analysis: The comparison of Russia and the DPRK is valid only at the level of individual control instruments, not systems. The key difference lies in the preservation of physical connectivity with global infrastructure and the presence of bypass channels: VPNs, limited SWIFT access, and a legal crypto circuit. For markets, this means that Russian capital retains partial integration into global flows, whereas the North Korean model remains fully closed and relies on extracting funds from outside through cyberattacks.