Fidelity Digital Assets' analytical division has presented a fresh perspective on the established dogma that every four-year reduction in miner rewards (halving) inevitably leads to a weakening of Bitcoin network security. In their new study, experts argue that the traditional understanding of the "security budget" is overly simplistic and fails to account for key economic mechanisms that make attacks on the first cryptocurrency's blockchain economically unfeasible.
Hashrate is not the network's only guardian
In the first part of the report, specialists analyze the concept of total miner rewards from block issuance. Bitcoin critics have long warned that halving the issuance rate after each halving will lead to a collapse in miner revenues, and future fees will not be able to compensate for this loss. However, Fidelity analysts consider this linear approach to be flawed.
The key argument is that the security of digital gold cannot be assessed solely through the lens of hashrate or reward size. The market value of the asset itself, the level of competition among miners, capital expenditures on equipment and electricity, and the fundamental economic unattractiveness of conducting an attack all play a decisive role. Illustrative statistics are provided: before the first halving in 2012, the average daily miner revenue was only $26,300. Today, despite the block reward dropping from 50 BTC to 3.125 BTC, this figure has grown to ~$40.2 million. This clearly demonstrates that the increase in the asset's price more than compensates for the reduction in issuance.
51% Attack: Expensive, complex, and pointless
Special attention in the report is given to analyzing the 51% attack. Specialists emphasize that simply gaining control over the majority of computing power is not enough. An attacker would need to bear enormous operational costs, and a successful attack would inevitably trigger a collapse of trust in the network and, consequently, a crash in the value of Bitcoin itself. Thus, the economic benefit of such an attack approaches zero.
Even the hypothetical possibility of censoring transactions or executing a double-spend attack faces serious obstacles in practice. First, the standard six-block confirmation wait time used by most exchanges makes rewriting history extremely difficult. Second, an attempt to monopolize block production would lead to an increase in fees, which, in turn, would attract new miners to the network, restoring the balance.
Looking to the future
The authors of the study acknowledge that their model is not perfect and assumes that the Bitcoin price must at least double every four years over an extended period. This makes the analysis vulnerable to various market scenarios. However, the main conclusion of the report is unequivocal: Bitcoin's security is a complex, multidimensional system of economic incentives, not merely a function of the number of coins issued.
Analyst's comment: This report is a timely reminder that Bitcoin is not just software code, but a complex economic ecosystem. Attempts to reduce its security to a single indicator, whether hashrate or miner revenue, ignore the main point—the self-healing nature of the network, where any attempts at destabilization create economic counter-incentives. The second part of the study, which will detail attack scenarios, promises to be even more interesting.