In recent years, a belief has taken root among critics of the first cryptocurrency that each subsequent reduction in miner rewards will inevitably weaken network security. However, as my calculations and analysis of market dynamics show, this view is overly simplistic and fails to account for the fundamental economic mechanisms embedded in Bitcoin's protocol.
Security is not just hash rate
The concept of a "security budget," often reduced to the total miner reward, is actually much more complex. After each halving, Bitcoin's issuance indeed halves, but this does not automatically mean a decrease in the level of protection. The key factor is the market value of the asset. Before the first halving in 2012, the average daily miner income was only $26,300. Today, with a reward of 3.125 BTC per block, this figure stands at about $40.2 million. The growth in Bitcoin's price more than compensates for the reduction in issuance, making the network even more resilient to attacks.
However, as I have repeatedly emphasized, betting everything on an endless price increase leads nowhere. A model assuming a doubling of price every four years for a century is utopian. That is why security analysis must include attack scenarios, not just optimistic forecasts.
51% Attack: Myths and Reality
Many believe that controlling the majority of the hash rate automatically gives an attacker unlimited power. In practice, this is not the case. To carry out a 51% attack, one must not only acquire expensive equipment and pay enormous electricity bills but also realize that a successful attack would instantly destroy trust in Bitcoin, wiping out the value of the very asset the attack was meant to target. Economic infeasibility is the network's main guardian.
Even if we assume a theoretical scenario where an attacker controls 99% of the hash rate, they cannot fully censor transactions. Rejected operations would simply end up in blocks generated by the remaining miners. Moreover, rising fees for priority transaction inclusion would attract new players to the network, further complicating the attacker's task.
Double Spending and Censorship: Defense Mechanisms
Theoretically, controlling the majority of the hash rate allows rewriting old blocks, but in practice, this is extremely difficult. The standard six-block confirmation wait time adopted by most exchanges makes a double-spending attack practically impossible for deep blocks. The deeper a transaction goes into the blockchain, the more costly and pointless an attempt to reverse it becomes.
Research in this area will continue. The second part of the analysis, which I await with great interest, should detail 51% attack scenarios and show how changes in miner revenue structure will affect blockchain resilience in the future.
My professional opinion: Bitcoin is not just a cryptocurrency but a complex economic system where security is ensured not by a single metric but by a set of market incentives. Fears about the "death of the network" after halvings are greatly exaggerated. As long as there is an economic benefit to mining, the network will remain one of the most secure in the world.