This week, financial markets were shaken by the news of the launch of the ambitious stablecoin project Open USD (OUSD) by the global alliance Open Standard. The consortium's participant list included titans such as Google, Visa, Mastercard, as well as key Korean players: Samsung Electronics, exchange operator Upbit Dunamu, financial group Shinhan, and several of South Korea's largest banks and card companies. However, as it turns out, the actual picture of participation is far from what was stated.
The Korean Front: "We Didn't Sign Anything"
Immediately after the publication of the participant list, Korean corporations rushed to issue official denials. Representatives of Samsung Electronics stated that they had not conducted any formal negotiations with the issuer of OUSD and learned of their inclusion in the consortium from the news. Dunamu, Shinhan, and K Bank took a similar stance. According to them, Open Standard was merely "testing the waters" by sending non-binding inquiries about potential interest. Any responses from Korean companies, if they existed, were general in nature, along the lines of "we'll consider it if the project goes well."
One representative of a financial institution directly called their appearance on the list "unexpected" and emphasized that no legally binding agreements exist. This situation creates significant information noise and calls into question the real weight of the declared alliance.
OUSD Architecture: An Attempt to Reshape the Market?
Despite the confusion with participants, the technical concept of OUSD deserves attention. The project positions itself not as a product of a single company, but as an open payment infrastructure. The issuance mechanism is classic: for every dollar deposited into a reserve account, 1 OUSD is issued. The key difference is the absence of issuance and redemption fees for network participants.
The most interesting part lies in the revenue distribution model. While Tether (USDT) and Circle (USDC) earn billions by investing user reserves in US Treasury bonds, OUSD promises to distribute all this income among network partners, keeping only a small operational fee for itself. This is a direct challenge to the established oligopoly, where the main profits are retained by the issuers.
My analysis: The situation with OUSD is a classic example of how loud announcements about partnerships outpace actual business agreements. The refusal of key Korean counterparties to participate is a serious blow to the project's credibility. However, the very idea of distributing income from reserves among network participants could become a powerful catalyst for competition. If OUSD manages to attract real, rather than "paper," partners, we could witness the first serious attempt to democratize the stablecoin market, which today is effectively divided between USDT and USDC. But for now, this is merely a beautiful concept, not a working model.