The Hyperliquid ecosystem, despite its innovation and decentralized architecture, is becoming fertile ground for sophisticated phishing attacks. We received a report from a trader who lost approximately $12,000 on the decentralized exchange HyperSwap, operating on the HyperEVM network. This incident is not just an isolated case, but a stark illustration of a systemic vulnerability where users fall victim due to the project team's insufficient response.
Attack Scheme: Classic, but with New Twists
It all started when the victim, who held liquidity in a HyperSwap pool, saw a post on social network X supposedly from the exchange's official account. The message offered an airdrop — a classic lure. Clicking the link, the user landed on a clone site visually indistinguishable from the real one. Behind this link was a drainer — a tool designed to steal funds from a crypto wallet.
The scammers created a duplicate account whose name differed from the official one by just a couple of letters. The official HyperSwap website links to one X account, while the fake post was published by a nearly indistinguishable duplicate. The victim did not notice the substitution and mistook the fake page for the real one.
The Moment of Theft: Less Than Two Minutes
On the fake website, the user connected their wallet and confirmed a transaction, believing they were checking eligibility for free tokens. In reality, they granted the scammer permission to manage their investment — an NFT with a unique number confirming their share in the liquidity pool.
The active phase of the theft occurred between 20:21 and 20:23 (UTC) on June 29, 2026. The fraudulent address, labeled by the hyperevmscan explorer as Fake_Phishing3746335 (a signal from the HashDit security service), used the previously granted access and transferred the NFT with the investment to its own wallet. Notably, this transaction was initiated and paid for by the attacker themselves — the victim did not sign anything at that moment. This is the essence of a drainer: access is tricked out in advance, and the withdrawal is carried out later, without the owner's involvement.
The scammer then withdrew the invested coins from the NFT: approximately 3935 USDC and 116 WHYPE, totaling around $12,100. Through the legitimate exchange service LI.FI, they converted all the stolen assets into HYPE and sent about $12,300 from the HyperEVM network to the Ethereum network. The funds arrived at an address created shortly before, which was used only once: it received the funds, almost immediately forwarded them further, and remained empty. This is a typical "transit" wallet.
Team Inaction: A Warning Sign
Upon discovering the loss, the victim tried to reach the Hyperliquid project team to have the suspicious link removed. The link remained in place. They claim they tried various ways to warn the team about the scam, but received no response. The only active communication channel with HyperSwap was Discord, but at the time of writing, the link to it was invalid. Attempts to bring the issue to the Hyperliquid ecosystem team also failed. The victim suggested that HyperSwap employees might be involved in the theft or deliberately covering it up.
How to Protect Yourself
- Access exchanges and services only via addresses from official sources, not through links in posts or direct messages on social media.
- Check the account name letter by letter: scammers create duplicates that differ by one or two letters.
- Do not confirm transactions in your wallet whose meaning you do not understand, especially granting permissions to manage tokens and investments.
- Regularly check and revoke granted permissions through trusted services, typing their address manually.
- If you suspect theft — revoke all permissions from the compromised wallet as quickly as possible and transfer remaining assets to a new one.
Expert Opinion: This incident is not just a story about one user's carelessness. It reveals a fundamental problem: in decentralized ecosystems, responsibility for security is often blurred between protocol teams and third-party applications. Hyperliquid, as the base network, does not manage HyperSwap, but it is on its infrastructure and under its "brand" that attacks occur. Without active moderation and at least minimal oversight of applications on its network, Hyperliquid risks turning into a "wild west" where every other post could be a trap. Users should remember: in DeFi, your security is first and foremost your own vigilance and ability to verify everything, including official channels.