Ethereum is rapidly transforming into an operating system for global finance, yet its own reward for this critical role is catastrophically small. While applications and Layer 2 (L2) networks built on top of it generate millions, Ethereum itself receives mere crumbs, like support staff rather than the infrastructure owner.
A concrete example illustrates this particularly starkly. In a single day of operation, the Robinhood blockchain, built on Ethereum, earned approximately $109,400. Meanwhile, the Ethereum network itself received only $716 for enabling this activity. This means that for every dollar paid to the network, Robinhood keeps roughly $153 for itself. In the first two weeks after launching its own L2, Robinhood earned over $800,000, paying Ethereum only about $1,500. This disparity allows Ethereum to be called a "janitor," receiving a symbolic fee for servicing the entire ecosystem.
The Root of the Structural Imbalance
These figures paint a "living picture" of the deep-seated problem within the cryptocurrency economy. On one hand, Ethereum serves as the "front door" for institutional capital. On July 1, 2026, for example, the Ethereum Institutional structure gathered leaders managing assets worth approximately $250 trillion. On the same day, Robinhood launched its Layer 2 network for tokenized stocks in over 120 countries.
The metaphor here is simple and precise: Ethereum provided the "courthouse," and Robinhood opened "shops" around it, taking all the margin and customers for itself. The company did nothing wrong—it simply followed Ethereum's roadmap, which the Ethereum Foundation itself had previously called "zones of control." From an engineering standpoint, everything worked perfectly: fees on the main network dropped from over $2 to less than $0.02, and on L2 by more than 95%. However, it was precisely these high fees that once made ETH a scarce asset.
Who Benefits from the Paradox?
Now, Ethereum burns about 25 coins per day but issues approximately 20,000 per week to stakers. As a result, supply is growing by nearly 0.85% per year, exceeding the level at the time of the transition to Proof-of-Stake. The value hasn't disappeared—it has simply changed recipients. Previously, scarcity rewarded all ETH holders equally. Now, the margin goes to L2 companies, and the new issuance goes to stakers.
The passive ETH holder has become the only participant in the system whose share is being diluted. Meanwhile, the largest businesses on Ethereum's "rails"—stablecoin issuers—hold reserves in US government bonds and own almost no ETH themselves. Analytics show that, for example, the company BitMine holds more than 5.77 ETH (about 4.8% of all coins), and its staking share is approximately 12% of all locked ETH.
My analysis: This paradox is not a temporary glitch but a fundamental contradiction. Ethereum, as neutral infrastructure, is becoming increasingly indispensable, but it is precisely this indispensability that reduces its ability to charge fees. If fees are high, activity moves to L2. If fees are low, the network becomes unattractive for token holders. Resolving this dilemma will require either a radical overhaul of ETH's monetary policy or the creation of mechanisms that allow the network to capture a portion of the value created on top of it. For now, in my estimation, after the promotional periods end, L2 fees will stabilize at a much lower level, which will only exacerbate the problem for ETH holders.