The cross-chain protocol Allbridge has been attacked again, in an incident almost identical to the one that occurred in 2023. This time, the attacker withdrew approximately $1.65 million from a liquidity pool on the Solana network. The most notable aspect of this story is that the vulnerability fix implemented by the protocol team after the previous incident simply did not reach the code on Solana. The protection was only applied to the patched version on BNB Chain, while the code for Solana remained unprotected.

How did the attack happen?

The mechanics of the hack were painfully familiar. The attacker used a flash loan on the Kamino platform, borrowing about $1.12 million in USDC. These funds were repeatedly cycled through the Allbridge stablecoin pool, artificially distorting the exchange rate. After that, the hacker withdrew liquidity at an inflated price, repaid the Kamino loan, and kept the difference. The entire operation was carried out within a single transaction, and the attacker did not spend a cent of their own funds.

As one researcher noted, the pool was simply "fed" false price data, which it trusted unconditionally. This is a classic oracle attack, known to the market since 2020, but Allbridge, apparently, did not draw the necessary conclusions.

Reaction and consequences

The Allbridge team promptly suspended the protocol's operation and urged liquidity providers from the affected pools to urgently withdraw their funds. The developers also appealed to arbitrage bots that had profited from the resulting imbalance, asking them to return the funds to compensate the victims. According to analysts, part of the stolen funds has already been moved through private protocols RAILGUN and Near Intents, significantly complicating tracking.

Services PeckShield and Lookonchain confirmed the scale of the damage and recorded the transfer of funds from Solana to Ethereum, where the hacker began exchanging them for ETH.

Expert opinion: This incident is a clear example of how "quick" security fixes can create a false sense of protection. Allbridge fixed the problem on one network but forgot to do the same on another. In a multi-chain world, each new network is essentially new code, and the approach to security must be universal, not fragmented. Otherwise, such "repeats" will become a sad norm.