The United States has recorded a record number of bankruptcies among large corporations for the second consecutive year. However, as my calculations and data analysis show, this alarming statistic hides a much more complex and polarized picture than it seems at first glance.
In the first half of 2026, 372 large American companies went bankrupt — the highest number since 2010. In 2025, the figure was nearly identical (371), which in itself was also a 16-year peak. At first glance, a crisis is evident. But digging deeper reveals that the number of bankruptcies is not skyrocketing but has stagnated at the same level, increasing by only 0.27%.
Two Different Credit Systems Under One Flag
Analysis shows that behind these numbers lies not a single trend, but two diametrically opposed worlds. The brunt of bankruptcies has hit three sectors: industrials (50 filings), consumer sector (35), and healthcare (26). This includes both public and large private companies, not the entire country's business landscape.
A key indicator is the dynamics of the credit market. The spread on high-yield bonds narrowed from 406 basis points in March to approximately 304 by June. The number of defaults on rated bonds fell from 63 to 50. The March peak in spreads was partly triggered by a geopolitical conflict in the Persian Gulf, but the market, seemingly ignoring this, continued to decline. Large companies with credit ratings, traded on exchanges, are successfully refinancing their debts and surviving.
A completely different picture emerges in the world of small businesses. The number of commercial Chapter 11 bankruptcies rose by 28% to 4,589, while small business reorganizations surged by 50% to 1,663. The difference, as I see it, lies in access to capital. Large corporations have access to capital markets and refinancing, whereas small and private businesses with floating interest rates end up in bankruptcy court. The court itself, by the way, functions not like a morgue but as a protective barrier: debt is converted into equity, and the business continues to operate. Last year, 61.2% of bankruptcies chose reorganization rather than liquidation.
The Hidden Threat in the Government Bond Market: Who Holds the Paper?
A separate, much more dangerous risk that I see is brewing in the government bond market. The crux of the problem lies in the changing composition of holders. In 2007, 75% of U.S. government bonds were held by price-insensitive buyers: central banks, the Federal Reserve, and commercial banks. Today, their share has fallen to 52%.
The vacated space has been filled by hedge funds. They conduct leveraged transactions financed by short-term repo loans. This, in my opinion, is where the main vulnerability lies. When the repo market freezes, such funds sell off their holdings quickly and all at once. This has happened before, in March 2020, when the Fed had to intervene to stop the collapse.
The situation is exacerbated by rising government spending. A $2 trillion annual deficit forces the Treasury to issue more and more government bonds, putting pressure on an already fragile market.
My conclusion: The next crisis in the bond market will not come from yields. It will be triggered not by the price of the paper, but by whose hands that paper ends up in. This shift in holders — from stable institutions to speculative funds — is the "sleeping" factor that could provoke a new wave of turbulence, far more serious than the current record bankruptcies.