For the second consecutive year, the United States is recording record levels of large company bankruptcies — 372 cases in the first half of 2026, the highest since 2010. However, behind this figure lies a much more complex and alarming picture than it seems at first glance. An analysis by independent experts reveals two different credit systems operating under one flag.
The key point: the number of large corporate bankruptcies is not growing but has essentially stagnated at a 16-year plateau. The increase was only 0.27% compared to the same period last year. The main burden fell on industry (50 filings), the consumer sector (35), and healthcare (26). This indicates not a systemic crisis but local problems in individual sectors.
At the same time, the spread on high-yield bonds narrowed from 406 basis points in March to approximately 304 in June, and the number of defaults on rated bonds decreased from 63 to 50. The market seems to ignore geopolitical risks, although the March peak in spreads was partly caused by the conflict in the Persian Gulf.
The World of Small Business: Where the Real Crisis Lies
A completely different picture unfolds in the small business segment. The number of commercial Chapter 11 bankruptcies rose by 28%, reaching 4,589. Reorganizations of small enterprises jumped by 50% — to 1,663. The difference between the two worlds is explained by access to capital: large companies with credit ratings can refinance debt, while small and private businesses with floating rates end up in bankruptcy court.
Notably, in this case, the court functions not as a "morgue" but as a protective barrier: debt is converted into equity, and the business continues to operate. Last year, 61.2% of bankruptcies chose reorganization rather than liquidation.
The Hidden Threat in the Government Bond Market
A separate risk, which almost no one talks about, is brewing in the U.S. government bond market. The structure of holders has changed dramatically: in 2007, 75% of Treasury securities were held by price-insensitive buyers — central banks, the Federal Reserve, and commercial banks. Today, their share has fallen to 52%. The vacated space has been taken by hedge funds, which conduct leveraged transactions financed by short-term repo loans.
When the repo market freezes, such funds sell off securities quickly and all at once. This already happened in March 2020, when the Fed had to intervene to stop the collapse. The situation is exacerbated by rising government spending: a $2 trillion annual deficit forces the issuance of more government bonds, which weigh on an already fragile market.
My conclusion: the next crisis in the bond market will not come from yields. It will be caused not by the price of securities, but by whose hands they end up in. The U.S. government bond market is not just an indicator; it is a ticking time bomb, and we are already seeing who is holding the match.