A superficial look at the U.S. economy captures an alarming signal: for the second consecutive year, the number of bankruptcies among large companies is breaking records. However, behind these numbers lies a much more complex and troubling picture. Analysis shows that under a single economic flag, the U.S. actually has two completely different credit systems, and their conditions differ dramatically.

In the first half of 2026, 372 large American companies went bankrupt — the highest since 2010. A year earlier, the figure was nearly identical at 371. This would seem to indicate a steady trend of deterioration. But, as my calculations show, this number does not represent explosive growth. It has essentially plateaued at a 16-year high, increasing by only 0.27%. The bulk of bankruptcies come from three sectors: industrials (50 filings), consumer sector (35), and healthcare (26). It is important to note that these are large public and private companies, not the entire business landscape of the country.

Two Poles: Stability of Big Capital and Collapse of Small Business

Confirmation of stability for large businesses comes from the dynamics in the high-yield bond market. The spread narrowed from 406 basis points in March to approximately 304 by June. The number of defaults on rated bonds also decreased — from 63 to 50. Notably, the March peak in the spread was partly triggered by the escalation of the conflict in the Persian Gulf. However, even after hostilities resumed this month, the indicator continued to decline, as if the market is ignoring external threats.

A completely different picture exists in the world of small and medium-sized businesses. Here, the number of commercial bankruptcies under Chapter 11 increased by 28%, reaching 4,589. And the number of small business reorganizations surged by 50% — to 1,663. The difference between these two worlds lies in access to financing. Large companies with credit ratings, traded on exchanges, can refinance debt and survive. Small and private businesses, sitting on floating rates, ultimately end up in bankruptcy court.

In this situation, the bankruptcy court itself functions not as a morgue, but as a protective barrier: debt is converted into equity, and the business continues to operate. Last year, 61.2% of bankruptcies chose reorganization rather than liquidation. This shows that the system is trying to adapt, but the strain on it is growing.

The Hidden Bomb in the Government Debt Market

However, there is a third, even deeper risk that almost no one is talking about. It lies in the changing structure of holders of U.S. government bonds. In 2007, 75% of government debt was held by "price-insensitive" buyers — central banks, the Fed, and commercial banks. Today, their share has fallen to 52%.

The vacated space has been filled by hedge funds. They conduct leveraged transactions financed by short-term repo loans. This is where I see the main threat. When the repo market freezes, such funds sell off their holdings quickly and all at once. This has happened before, in March 2020, when the Fed had to intervene to stop the collapse.

The situation is exacerbated by rising government spending. A $2 trillion annual deficit forces the issuance of more bonds, which pressure an already fragile market. My conclusion is unequivocal: the next crisis in the bond market will not come from yields. It will be caused not by the price of the securities, but by whose hands they end up in. And if hedge funds start dumping their positions, we will see a liquidity collapse that will affect all asset classes, including cryptocurrencies.

As an analyst, I see that the current situation is not just bankruptcy statistics. It is a systemic shift, where big capital isolates itself from risks through access to cheap financing, while small businesses and the government debt market become zones of heightened turbulence. Investors should prepare for volatility, the source of which will not be the corporate sector, but the world's most "risk-free" asset.