Over the past two years, from July 2022 to June 2024, I recorded 270 million address poisoning attempts on the Ethereum and BNB Chain networks. These attacks affected 17 million wallets, with confirmed losses exceeding $83.8 million. After the Fusaka upgrade, the number of "dust" USDT transfers surged by 612% — a worrying signal for all market participants.
Two Faces of One Threat
In the crypto world, the term "dust" describes two completely different types of attacks. The first is classic dusting for deanonymization. The attacker sends microscopic amounts to thousands of addresses. As soon as the victim spends these coins alongside their main funds, analytical tools link all addresses into one cluster, revealing the owner's identity and assets.
The second type is address poisoning, or address spoofing. Here, the goal is not surveillance but outright theft. The attacker creates a lookalike address similar to the one the victim regularly sends funds to and sends a micro-transfer from it. The logic is simple: the next time, the user will copy the details from the transaction history without fully checking them. The most high-profile case occurred in May 2024, when a hacker spent just $0.65 on fees but stole 1,155 WBTC — about $68 million at the exchange rate at the time.
How Dusting Works: The Bitcoin Example
The mechanics of dusting are based on the UTXO model in Bitcoin. Funds here are not a single balance but a set of unspent outputs, like banknotes of different denominations. The attacker generates dust outputs of a few hundred satoshis and sends them to thousands of addresses. When the victim's wallet automatically selects such an output along with clean coins for a payment, both end up in the same transaction. The common-input-ownership heuristic kicks in, and all addresses are linked to a single owner.
Then external data comes into play. Analytical companies like Chainalysis match the cluster with exchange KYC data, IP addresses, and behavioral patterns. This turns an anonymous address into a specific name.
A Lookalike in History: How Millions Are Stolen
Address poisoning exploits the human factor. Most users verify addresses only by the first and last characters — for example, bc1qa...16z. The attacker brute-forces keys on a GPU at a rate of over 500 million addresses per second to obtain a lookalike with the same starting and ending characters as the regular recipient. This takes about 72 seconds for Ethereum and slightly longer for Bitcoin due to a different alphabet.
Competition among attackers is fierce: in 79% of successful attacks on Ethereum, the same victim was simultaneously targeted by multiple teams. The most successful group earned $29 million with expenses of $2.7 million. A telling case occurred in December 2025: a trader first sent a test 50 USDT to the correct address, but a few minutes later copied the details from the poisoned history and lost nearly $50 million.
Protection: Find and Don't Touch
The main principle of protection against dusting is that dust is harmless as long as it remains untouched. Danger arises only when it ends up in the same transaction as your coins. I recommend three steps:
- Label every suspicious small incoming transaction as "dust" immediately upon receipt.
- Freeze such outputs via coin control so the wallet doesn't automatically include them.
- Never combine dust with clean coins in a single payment.
The coin control feature is available in desktop wallets such as Sparrow Wallet and Trezor Suite. For protection against address poisoning, I advise verifying the entire address, storing regular recipients' details in a separate address book, and never copying them from the transaction history. Large amounts should be confirmed via a second channel — a phone call or messenger. Hardware wallets like Ledger and Trezor prevent clipboard spoofing by displaying the full address on the device screen.
If the Graph Is Already Built
If you have already spent a dust output along with your main funds, freezing won't change anything — the links between addresses are already formed. To break the graph, you need a new fund history. Traditional CoinJoin-based mixers leave a characteristic pattern on the blockchain that is easily recognized by analytical services. A more effective approach is services that give coins a completely new history, such as withdrawals from major exchanges. In "Full Anonymity" mode, bitcoins are split, sent to independent traders, and the client receives a payout from exchange wallets. To AML systems, this looks like a standard fund withdrawal.
My analysis: The cryptocurrency market is becoming increasingly hostile for inattentive users. The 612% increase in dust attacks after the Fusaka upgrade is not a coincidence but a pattern. Protocols are becoming more complex, but the human factor remains the most vulnerable point. I strongly recommend that anyone holding significant amounts implement basic security rules: coin control, an address book, and a hardware wallet. This is not a luxury but a necessity in the modern on-chain space.