Over the past two years, from mid-2022 to mid-2024, a colossal number of address poisoning attacks have been recorded on the Ethereum and BNB Chain networks — over 270 million attempts affecting 17 million wallets. The confirmed damage has exceeded $83.8 million. After the Fusaka upgrade, the number of "dust" USDT transfers skyrocketed by 612%. This is not just statistics, but an alarming signal for all market participants.
It is important to understand that the term "dust" in cryptocurrencies refers to two completely different types of attacks, and confusing them is dangerous. The first is classic dusting for deanonymization. The second is a more insidious address poisoning, aimed directly at stealing funds. Let's break down each of them in detail.
Spy Attack: How Privacy Is Lost
In dusting, an attacker sends microscopic amounts to thousands of wallets. Their goal is not to steal, but to find out who you are and how many coins you have. As soon as the victim spends this "dust" along with their main funds, on-chain analytics (e.g., common-input-ownership heuristic) links all addresses into a single cluster. Then external data comes into play — exchange KYC, IP addresses, behavioral patterns.
Protection here is simple: dust is harmless as long as you don't touch it. Use coin control — manual selection of coins for sending. Mark suspicious UTXOs as "dust" and freeze them. Tools like Sparrow Wallet or Trezor Suite make this easy to do.
Thief Attack: $68 Million for a $0.65 Fee
The second type of "dust" is a true epidemic of 2024-2025. The attacker generates a look-alike address that matches your regular recipient's address in the first and last characters. They then send a micro-transaction to your wallet from this address, and the fake details settle in the transaction history next to the real ones. The hope is that next time you will copy an address from the history without looking at the middle.
The scale of the threat is illustrated by a case where a trader, after sending a test 50 USDT to the correct address, copied the details from the "poisoned" history a few minutes later and transferred nearly $50 million to the scammer. Modern GPUs allow generating the desired vanity address in seconds. Competition among attackers is fierce: in 79% of successful attacks on Ethereum, a single victim was simultaneously "poisoned" by several teams.
My professional opinion: The market overestimates the protection of hardware wallets and underestimates the human factor. As long as users copy addresses from transaction history instead of a verified address book, substitution attacks will continue to bring in millions. The only reliable protection is discipline: verify the entire address, store the details of regular recipients separately, and for large amounts, use confirmation via a second channel (phone call, messenger). If the graph has already been built and your privacy is compromised, simply changing wallets won't help — here you need tools for a complete coin history refresh, such as mixers.