Market analysis reveals an alarming trend: between July 2022 and June 2024 alone, approximately 270 million address poisoning attempts were recorded on the Ethereum and BNB Chain networks, affecting 17 million wallets. The confirmed damage from these attacks exceeded $83.8 million. Particularly telling is the surge following the Fusaka upgrade — the number of "dust" USDT transfers increased by 612%. This is not just statistics, but a signal of a systemic vulnerability that attackers are actively exploiting.

Two Faces of One Threat

In the crypto community, the term "dust" is used to denote two fundamentally different types of attacks. The first is classic dusting, aimed at deanonymizing a wallet owner. The second is address poisoning, where the goal is direct theft of funds. It is important to understand the difference, as protection methods differ drastically.

In the first case, the attacker sends microscopic amounts to thousands of addresses. Danger arises when the victim spends this "dust" along with their main funds. On-chain analysis links the addresses into one cluster, revealing the user's identity and total balance. In the second case, the attacker creates a look-alike address similar to the one the victim regularly sends funds to. A micro-transfer from this address appears in the transaction history, and the next time, the user, without looking, copies the scammer's details. The most high-profile incident occurred in May 2024, when an address poisoning attack cost a victim $68 million, while the attacker spent only $0.65 on fees.

Mechanics and Vulnerabilities

Dusting is based on Bitcoin's UTXO model. Funds are represented as separate "banknotes" (outputs). When a wallet spends multiple outputs in one transaction, on-chain analysis is highly likely to link them to a single owner. The attacker generates "dust" (outputs of a few hundred satoshis), sends them out, and waits for the victim's wallet to automatically include them in a payment. Then, analytical companies step in, matching clusters with KYC data and IP addresses.

Address poisoning exploits the human habit of verifying details by the first and last characters. Modern GPUs with tools like Profanity2 generate over 500 million addresses per second, allowing vanity addresses to be matched in seconds. Competition among attackers is fierce: in 79% of successful attacks on Ethereum, one victim was simultaneously "poisoned" by multiple groups. The December 2025 incident, where a trader transferred nearly $50 million to a scammer due to matching first three and last four characters, clearly demonstrates the cost of a mistake.

Protection and Recovery Strategies

Protection against dusting is based on one principle: "dust" is harmless as long as it remains untouched. The key tool is coin control, which allows manually selecting which UTXOs to spend. Suspicious incoming transactions should be marked as "dust" and frozen so the wallet does not automatically include them. To protect against address poisoning, it is critically important not to copy details from transaction history. Use an address book, verify the entire address, and for large sums, confirm the recipient through a second communication channel.

If a graph has already been built and addresses are merged into a cluster, simply changing wallets will not help. Services that give coins a new history are required, such as Bitcoin mixers. Unlike CoinJoin, which leaves characteristic patterns, some solutions, like Mixer.Money, operate on the principle of exchanging for coins recently withdrawn from exchanges, making them indistinguishable to AML systems.

My comment as an analyst: The market is moving towards stricter security requirements, and ignoring "dust" threats is a direct path to losing funds or privacy. Protection tools are already available, but their use requires discipline. Investors, especially those with large portfolios, should consider coin control and address books not as an option, but as a mandatory standard of operation.