Between July 2022 and June 2024, specialists from the CyLab laboratory at Carnegie Mellon University recorded 270 million address poisoning attempts on the Ethereum and BNB Chain networks, affecting 17 million wallets. Confirmed losses exceeded $83.8 million. After the Fusaka upgrade, the number of "dust" USDT transfers surged by 612%.
In the crypto industry, the term "dust" is used to describe two fundamentally different types of attacks. The first aims to deanonymize the wallet owner, while the second targets the theft of funds. Together with the team behind the Bitcoin mixer Mixer.Money, we break down the mechanics of these attacks, their differences, and protection methods.
Spy and Thief: Two Sides of the Same "Dust"
The first technique is dusting for deanonymization. The attacker sends microscopic amounts to thousands of wallets. When the recipient spends these coins alongside their main funds, an analyst links the addresses into a single cluster. The goal is to find out who you are and how much crypto you hold.
The second technique is address poisoning. Here, the micro-transfer works differently: the attacker injects a look-alike address into the transaction history, resembling one you regularly send funds to. The hope is that next time, you'll copy the details without looking.
In May 2024, such an attack netted the attacker 1155 WBTC, costing them only $0.65 in fees. The victim lost $68 million at the exchange rate at the time of the transfer.
| Criterion | Dusting for Surveillance | Address Poisoning |
|---|---|---|
| Attacker's Goal | to find out who owns the wallet | to steal funds |
| What They Do | send dust outputs to thousands of addresses | send a micro-transfer from a look-alike address |
| When It Works | when you spend dust alongside clean coins | when you copy details from transaction history |
| What You Lose | privacy and trading strategy | money, irreversibly |
| How to Defend | labels, output freezing, coin control | address book and full address verification |
Dusting Mechanics: How UTXO Becomes a Vulnerability
To understand dusting, it's important to recall the UTXO model in Bitcoin. Funds are represented as individual unspent transaction outputs — comparable to banknotes of arbitrary denominations. A wallet's balance is the sum of all outputs under your control.
To transfer 0.3 BTC, a wallet with outputs of 0.2 and 0.15 BTC will combine them in a single transaction. This is the basis of the Common Input Ownership Heuristic: if a transaction has multiple inputs, they likely belong to the same person.
The scheme unfolds in four steps:
- The attacker generates dust outputs worth a few hundred satoshis.
- Sends them to thousands of addresses.
- The victim's wallet automatically selects the dust output along with regular coins to make up the payment amount.
- Both outputs end up in the same transaction, and on-chain analysis links their addresses to one owner.
External data then comes into play. Analytics companies match the cluster with exchange KYC data, IP addresses, and behavioral patterns.
Look-Alike in History: Address Poisoning in Detail
The second technique works differently. The attacker doesn't try to deanonymize the owner — their goal is to steal funds. The scheme relies on the habit of verifying details by the first and last characters. Most interfaces display them in a truncated form.
"Essentially, it's a convenience issue. Addresses are impossible to memorize, people tend to simply copy them from transfer history. This behavior creates the vulnerability," comment Mixer.Money.
The attacker brute-forces keys on GPUs until they get a look-alike with the same first and last characters. Then, a micro-transfer is sent from the ready address, and the fake details settle in the transaction list.
Modern GPUs with tools like Profanity2 generate over 500 million addresses per second — enough to find a matching address in about 72 seconds. In Bitcoin, this is harder due to the bech32 alphabet, but parallel processing still makes it achievable.
The most successful group in the CyLab sample earned $29 million with expenses of $2.7 million. Competition is fierce: in 79% of successful attacks on Ethereum, multiple teams targeted the same victim simultaneously.
A notable incident occurred in December 2025. A trader first sent a test 50 USDT to the correct address, then a few minutes later copied details from the poisoned history and transferred 49,999,950 USDT to the scammer. The look-alike matched the first three and last four characters.
Bitcoin has a structural advantage: dust in UTXO creates a separate, distinguishable output that can be isolated and never spent.
Find and Don't Touch: Protection Against Dusting
Protection is built on one principle: dust is harmless as long as it remains untouched. It becomes dangerous when it ends up in the same transaction as your coins. So, you need to find and freeze it.
Coin control — manual selection of coins for payment — allows you to exclude suspicious outputs. Without it, the wallet automatically selects outputs to optimize fees and may pull in a dust UTXO into a transaction.
Practical discipline boils down to three rules:
- Label every suspicious small incoming transaction as "dust" immediately upon receipt.
- Freeze suspicious outputs so the wallet doesn't automatically include them.
- Never combine dust with clean coins in a single payment.
This feature is available in desktop wallets with output labeling, such as Sparrow Wallet and Trezor Suite. They allow assigning labels and manually selecting coins for sending or freezing UTXOs.

Mixer.Money recommends not touching dust and labeling it, and always taking the recipient for each payment from the address book, not from the transaction list.
"Verify the entire address, store regular recipients' details in a separate list, and don't copy them from history. Confirm large amounts via a second channel: a call or messenger. Hardware wallets like Ledger and Trezor display the full address on the device screen and prevent clipboard substitution," experts add.
How to Maintain Anonymity
Coin control prevents dust from entering new transactions but doesn't remove already established links. If you once spent a dust output alongside other coins and the addresses ended up in one cluster, freezing won't change anything.
To break the graph, you need a new history for the funds. Bitcoin mixers are one tool. CoinJoin breaks the common input ownership heuristic but leaves a characteristic pattern on the blockchain that analytics services recognize algorithmically.
The Mixer.Money service works differently: on the output, the coins have no on-chain link to the "dusted" cluster. In "Full Anonymity" mode, bitcoins go to a premixer, are split into random parts, sent to independent traders on major exchanges, and a payout comes to new addresses in return.
"Unlike CoinJoin, our algorithm excludes mixing client funds with each other. The user receives an equivalent amount of coins recently withdrawn from exchanges with a completely different history," explain Mixer.Money.
For AML systems, such a payout looks like a standard withdrawal from a trading platform to a personal address. Besides "Full Anonymity," "Mixer" mode (basic privacy for a 1% fee) and "Exact Payment" mode (sending funds to a third party via the service) are available. No registration is required; each operation comes with a guarantee letter with a PGP signature.
Dust-Proof Wallet: Final Recommendations
Dust carries two threats, and the response to each differs.
If it's dusting for deanonymization, such coins cannot be spent alongside main funds. Label the UTXO, freeze it via coin control — and no link between addresses will form.
If it's address poisoning, the micro-transfer itself poses no danger. The risk comes from the look-alike in the transaction list. Don't copy details from there: verify the entire recipient address and send funds only from address book entries.
If the graph is already built and addresses are combined into a cluster, changing wallets won't fix it. Services that give coins a new history, like Mixer.Money, help here.
Expert Opinion: In the current market situation, where DeFi volumes and on-chain activity are growing, dust attacks are becoming increasingly widespread. Users should reconsider their security habits: using an address book and coin control should become the standard, not the exception. Ignoring these simple measures can lead to millions in losses — as practice shows, attackers are becoming more inventive.