The SecondFi team has officially announced the complete shutdown of its wallet on the Cardano blockchain. The reason is a large-scale attack during which an attacker withdrew 16.1 million ADA. This decision marks the final chapter in the history of one of the key tools in the Cardano ecosystem.
Timeline and Scale of the Hack
The incident occurred between June 21 and June 23. Over these days, an unknown attacker drained 374 wallets totaling approximately $2.6 million. It is important to emphasize: the Cardano blockchain was not compromised. Users of hardware wallets were also unaffected — the vulnerability exclusively impacted the service's own software.
Technical Nature of the Vulnerability
The root of the problem is a critical error in the digital signature creation mechanism. As experts determined, the Ed25519 algorithm used a nonce that was generated solely based on the public hash of the transaction. In a correct implementation, the nonce should depend on secret data inaccessible from the outside. However, in SecondFi, this secret component was missing. By analyzing just one published signature, an attacker could recover the private key and sign a transfer on behalf of the wallet owner.
Two Attackers and Traces of Lazarus
An investigation conducted by Groom Lake revealed that the attack was carried out by at least two independent entities. The first attacker withdrew funds from 171 wallets, the second from 203. The main attack was executed by a technically sophisticated and well-funded external entity. Some indicators point to a possible overlap with the North Korean hacker group Lazarus. Notably, no intersections were found between the affected addresses of the two attackers.
Service Fate and Fund Recovery
The vulnerability has been fixed, and new wallets created after the update are considered secure. However, EMURGO, the development company, has made a radical decision: SecondFi and the Yoroi wallet are completely shutting down. The service is currently operating in isolation mode — users can only view balances and addresses. Sending, exchanging, or transferring assets is unavailable.
In early August, a secure wallet export feature is planned to be launched, allowing assets to be transferred without reusing compromised data. A separate recovery portal based on zero-knowledge proofs is being developed for affected users. The team is also cooperating with law enforcement agencies to determine how the vulnerable code ended up in the public GitHub repository.
My analysis: This incident is a stark example of how even fundamental errors in implementing cryptographic algorithms can lead to catastrophic consequences for an entire service. EMURGO's decision to completely shut down the project, despite fixing the vulnerability, shows how seriously the company assesses the loss of user trust. For the Cardano ecosystem, this is a painful blow, but it also underscores the importance of using hardware wallets and thorough code auditing.