The cross-chain bridge of the Verus protocol has been attacked again. The attacker withdrew approximately $7.5 million in various assets from the reserves and has already begun laundering the funds through the Tornado Cash mixer. This time, the attack mechanism almost completely replicates the May exploit of the same bridge, which netted the hacker $11.58 million. This is not a new vulnerability, but a reuse of an old one — and it is a worrying signal for the entire industry.

What Happened

Several analytical firms, including Lookonchain and PeckShield, have detected suspicious activity. Eight transfers in different assets were made from the bridge's custodial reserves: ETH, DAI, USDC, USDT, and four other tokens. The attacker has already begun moving the stolen funds through Tornado Cash. According to SlowMist, four key addresses are involved in the incident: the attacker's wallet, the bridge itself, the vulnerable contract, and the recipient's wallet.

The root of the problem lies in the VerusProof.checkExportAndTransfers function. It only checked part of the CCE (Cross-Chain Export) fields, ignoring critically important parameters: totalamounts, totalfees, totalburned, as well as the nValue of CTxOut. The system did not verify that the previous CCE outpoint carried sufficient value and assets to cover the declared transfers. As a result, a matching transfer hash was mistakenly interpreted as permission to mint bridge assets.

The difference from the May attack is only in the details: then, the verified proof was decoupled from the executable payload of the transfer; now, the transfers were strictly tied to the CCE by hash, but the system did not verify the economic backing of the CCE itself. Both incidents exploit the same class of vulnerability — insufficient validation of cross-chain imports.

Notably, there has been no official response from the Verus team yet. Their social media accounts have been abandoned since May 2026 — the last posts on X date back to the period of the previous hack. This raises serious questions about the current state of the project and its ability to protect user funds.

Cross-chain bridges remain one of the most vulnerable segments of the market. In 2026, this category has already accounted for eight major exploits with a total damage of $328.6 million. The repeated attack on Verus is a clear demonstration that the industry still hasn't learned to draw the right conclusions from past mistakes.

Expert opinion: Until teams start implementing multi-level validation and formal verification of smart contracts before launch, we will see such stories again and again. Verus is a stark example of how a lack of attention to basic security can cost millions of dollars.