The Ethereum bridge of the Verus protocol has been attacked again. The attacker withdrew approximately $7.5 million from reserves and has already begun laundering the funds through Tornado Cash. The hack mechanism almost completely replicates the May exploit of the same bridge, which resulted in $11.58 million in losses.

Several analytical firms immediately detected the attack. Lookonchain estimated the damage at $7.55 million, while PeckShield confirmed that the hacker has started laundering the stolen funds through the Tornado Cash mixer. Eight transfers of different assets were recorded from the bridge's custodial reserves: ETH, DAI, USDC, USDT, and four other tokens.

According to SlowMist, the following addresses are involved in the incident:

  • Attacker's wallet (EOA) — 0xbda71b58cec0b1c20a8f87ccd52fa0679747855c
  • Compromised bridge — 0x71518580f36feceffe0721f06ba4703218cd7f63
  • Vulnerable contract — 0x54e03a1682fd0bb065b669f6296f97028dcfd4ce
  • Fund recipient — 0xcfd0a20703cd11e0b9f665e1c3f1ef989c142d54

Cause of the Hack

The root of the problem lies in the VerusProof.checkExportAndTransfers function. It only verified part of the CCE fields:

  • hashReserveTransfers relative to the serialized transfers provided by the attacker;
  • source and destination identifiers.

However, the function did not verify the accounting semantics of the CCE: it ignored the totalamounts, totalfees, totalburned fields, the nValue of CTxOut, and did not ensure that the previous CCE outpoint carried sufficient value and assets to cover the claimed transfers. As a result, a matching transfer hash was mistakenly interpreted as permission to issue bridge assets.

Both incidents exploit the same class of vulnerability — insufficient validation of cross-chain imports. In the May case, the verified proof was decoupled from the executable transfer payload; in the current case, transfers were tightly bound to the CCE by hash, but the system did not verify the economic backing of the CCE itself.

The Verus team has not yet issued an official response. The project's social media accounts have been abandoned since May 2026 — the last posts on X date back to the period of the previous hack.

My professional opinion: Cross-chain bridges remain one of the most vulnerable segments of the market. In 2026, this category has already accounted for eight major exploits with a total damage of $328.6 million. The repeated exploitation of the same vulnerability in Verus is a troubling signal for the entire industry: without a fundamental overhaul of bridge security architecture, we will continue to see such incidents time and again.