The Verus protocol has once again fallen victim to a hack. The attacker drained approximately $7.5 million from the Ethereum bridge reserves and has already begun laundering the stolen funds through the Tornado Cash mixer. Analysts confirm that the attack mechanics are nearly identical to the May exploit of the same bridge, which resulted in $11.58 million in losses.
Incident Details
The attack was detected by several analytical firms. According to Lookonchain's estimates, the damage amounts to $7.55 million. PeckShield reports that the hacker has already started laundering the funds. Eight transfers in various assets were withdrawn from the bridge's custodial reserves: ETH, DAI, USDC, USDT, and four other tokens.
SlowMist provided the addresses involved in the incident: the attacker's wallet (EOA), the compromised bridge, the vulnerable contract, and the recipient address. The attack scheme relied on the bridge trusting a transfer request without verifying its backing. The attacker crafted a fake withdrawal request and linked it to a real, previously accepted state of the Verus network, giving the request an appearance of legitimacy. In the request, they independently specified eight transfers in their favor.
The bridge verified the request's checksum and confirmed it matched the list of transfers. However, it failed to verify the key element—whether real assets on the Verus side backed these transfers. Without detecting any backing, the bridge still executed all eight payments and sent the funds to the attacker's address.
Cause of the Hack
SlowMist traces the root of the problem to the VerusProof.checkExportAndTransfers function. It only verified a portion of the CCE fields: hashReserveTransfers against the serialized transfers provided by the attacker, as well as the source and destination identifiers. However, the function did not verify the accounting semantics of the CCE. It ignored the totalamounts, totalfees, totalburned fields, the nValue of CTxOut, and did not ensure that the previous CCE outpoint carried sufficient value and assets to cover the declared transfers. As a result, the matching transfer hash was mistakenly interpreted as permission to release the bridge's assets.
Both incidents—the May one and the current one—exploit the same class of vulnerability: insufficient validation of cross-chain imports. The current attack differs from the previous hack in details but not in essence. In May, the verified proof was decoupled from the executed transfer payload. In the current case, the transfers were rigidly tied to the CCE by hash, but the system did not verify the economic backing of the CCE itself.
Notably, the May hack ended atypically for DeFi. The Verus developers offered the hacker a deal: return 75% of the stolen funds (4052.4 ETH) within 24 hours, promising in return to cease the investigation and forgo legal prosecution. The hacker agreed and transferred 4052.4 ETH (approximately $8.5 million) to the project's wallet, keeping roughly $2.8 million as a reward.
Cryptalist Analysis: The repeated hacking of the same bridge through a similar vulnerability is an alarming signal for the entire cross-chain solutions industry. It is evident that the Verus team did not address the root cause of the problem after the May incident, raising questions about the developers' competence and the protocol's security. Cross-chain bridges remain one of the weakest links in the DeFi ecosystem: in 2026, this category has already accounted for eight major exploits with a total damage of $328.6 million. Investors should exercise extreme caution when interacting with such solutions, especially if they have been compromised before.