History repeats itself. The Ethereum bridge of the Verus protocol has been attacked again — a hacker withdrew approximately $7.5 million in various crypto assets from its reserves. The stolen funds have already begun being laundered through the Tornado Cash mixer, indicating the attacker's professional preparation.
Notably, this hack almost completely mirrors the May exploit of the same bridge, which resulted in $11.58 million in losses. According to analytical firms, the attack mechanism is identical — the attacker exploited an old vulnerability that was never fully fixed.
Attack Details
The hacker recorded eight withdrawal transactions from the bridge's custodial reserves. The assets include ETH, DAI, USDC, USDT, and four other tokens. SlowMist analysts identified key addresses involved in the incident: the attacker's wallet (0xbda7...785c), the compromised bridge (0x7151...7f63), the vulnerable contract (0x54e0...4ce), and the recipient address (0xcfd0...d54).
The root of the problem lies in the VerusProof.checkExportAndTransfers function, which only verified part of the CCE (Cross-Chain Export) fields. The system checked the transfer hash and source/destination identifiers but ignored critical fields such as totalamounts, totalfees, totalburned, and the nValue of CTxOut. Moreover, it did not verify whether the previous CCE outpoint carried sufficient value to cover the claimed transfers.
As a result, the bridge trusted a fake withdrawal request tied to a real, previously accepted Verus network state. The matching transfer hash was falsely interpreted as permission to mint bridge assets.
Repeating the Mistake
Although the attack details differ — in the May case, the proof was decoupled from the executed payload, while in the current one, transfers were rigidly tied to the CCE by hash — the essence is the same: both exploits leverage insufficient validation of cross-chain imports. The bridge did not verify the economic backing of the CCE itself.
Remarkably, after the May hack, the Verus team offered the hacker a deal: return 75% of the stolen funds (4052.4 ETH), and we will consider the remaining 1350 ETH as your bounty. The hacker agreed and returned the funds. However, the team never fixed the root cause of the vulnerability.
Expert opinion: In 2026, cross-chain bridges have already accounted for eight major exploits with a total loss of $328.6 million. Verus is a stark example of how ignoring fundamental vulnerabilities in favor of quick fixes leads to repeated losses. Protocols must implement formal verification of smart contracts and multi-layered validation of cross-chain transactions, or history will keep repeating itself.