The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) has once again introduced single-stock futures contracts to the market, this time covering 55 of the most liquid stocks on the U.S. market. The instruments trade 23 hours a day, including weekends, with cash settlement and leverage. However, in my firm belief, this initiative offers no real value to retail investors.

Analyzing this event, I conclude that the CME is repeating past mistakes. Back in 2002, the exchange made a similar attempt that ended in a spectacular failure. At that time, following the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (2000), confusion arose in regulation between the SEC and the CFTC. Brokers simply did not understand how to execute these contracts. Moreover, this law removed over-the-counter derivatives from oversight, which, as the 2008 crisis showed, led to uncontrolled growth in the credit default swap market.

But the main reason for the 2002 failure, in my view, was simple: stock futures offered investors no economic advantage over existing instruments, primarily exchange-traded options. Fractional liquidity, fragmented across individual stocks, became the product's Achilles' heel.

Why did CME return to this idea?

I see two key reasons. First, the behavior of retail investors has radically changed. American retail traders today are using leverage more actively than ever. Free commissions, leveraged ETFs, 0 DTE options, and cryptocurrency perpetual contracts are all signs of what I call "retail leverage." Before 2008, such demand for risk simply did not exist.

Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the CME has taken a defensive stance. Platforms like Coinbase, Robinhood, and Hyperliquid are actively competing for the same retail client. The battle is over "distribution channels"—who will become the "universal broker." Money behaves like a gravitational field: the greater the mass, the stronger the attraction. In this race, the product itself is no longer the futures contract but the investor. Their willingness to trade is converted into profit for market makers and high-frequency traders.

Why options, not futures?

From my perspective, the real outlet for retail investors is options. They provide the best asymmetric leverage with high convexity and a long duration. Perpetual contracts, on the other hand, I consider dangerous for retail traders. I fully agree with CME Chairman Terry Duffy: perpetuals are a bad product for retail, as investors cannot control the outcome and risk being liquidated by institutional players.

The value of an option lies in time. Duration is an asset that deserves a premium. The option holder receives the right, but not the obligation, to manage that time at their discretion. Drawing a historical parallel, I see that in the upcoming debates around the CLARITY Act, the most important point will be an obscure clause about over-the-counter derivatives, much like the "Enron loophole" became key in the 2008 crisis.

My professional opinion: The CME is trying to ride the wave of retail demand for leverage, but it is offering a product that gives retail investors no structural advantage over large players. Retail traders should focus on options rather than futures, which only exacerbate their vulnerability to institutional capital.