A major attack occurred on the BNB Smart Chain blockchain targeting the LULA token, resulting in the attacker draining approximately $578,000 from the liquidity pool of the decentralized exchange PancakeSwap. Notably, the exchange itself was not hacked — the vulnerability lay in the token's own code.
Reserve Manipulation: How the Exploit Worked
The key element of the attack was the recycle() function in the Rental contract. It granted the attacker two critical capabilities: first, directly withdrawing LULA tokens from the PancakeSwap V2 pool, and second, calling the sync() function, which forcibly synchronized the pair's accounting reserves with the new, already distorted balances.
Simply put, a DEX pool can be imagined as a scale with two pans: one with USDT, the other with LULA. The price is determined by their ratio. A regular trader can only move coins from one pan to another through swaps. But the recycle() function allowed removing tokens from one pan "from the side," while sync() forced the scale to recognize the new position as fair.
The sequence of actions, as described by BlockSec Phalcon analysts, was as follows:
- A large swap of USDT for LULA, which artificially inflated the USDT reserve in the pair;
- Multiple calls to recycle(), which reduced the LULA reserve;
- A reverse swap of a small amount of LULA, which effectively "drained" the pool's liquidity.
The logic of the maneuver is simple: the fewer tokens remain on one pan of the scale, the more expensive each one becomes. By artificially compressing the volume of LULA in the pair, the attacker exchanged a small number of tokens at a fictitiously inflated rate.
Preparation Over 12 Days
This attack was not spontaneous. Twelve days before the exploit, the hacker deployed auxiliary contracts to accumulate referral and team rewards. The pre-prepared right to payouts became the entry point: the claimReward() → recycle() chain allowed maximizing the deflationary effect, i.e., compressing the number of tokens in circulation.
For the main stage, a flash loan of approximately $237 million was used. A flash loan works like money borrowed for a few seconds "on good faith": the borrower must return the amount within the same transaction, otherwise it is entirely reversed. No personal capital is needed for this, making such a tool often used to amplify price manipulations. The borrowed funds were used to withdraw LULA from the DEX pool, enhancing the effect of the recycle() calls.
Expert commentary: This is a classic example of how a vulnerability in a token's smart contract, not the exchange, becomes the cause of financial losses. Investors should remember: even if a DEX operates flawlessly, the token itself can be a "time bomb" due to unsafe functions in its code. Analyzing contracts before investing is no longer a recommendation but a necessity.