An attack on the LULA token was recorded on BNB Smart Chain, resulting in the attacker withdrawing approximately $578,000 from the liquidity pool. The incident is notable because the hacker did not hack the exchange itself — the vulnerability lay in the token's code.

The LULA token was traded in a liquidity pool on the decentralized exchange PancakeSwap. The attack was made possible by exploiting the recycle() function in the token's smart contract. This function granted the Rental contract two critical rights: directly withdrawing LULA from the PancakeSwap V2 pool and calling the sync() function, which synchronizes the pool's accounting reserves with its actual, already distorted balances.

Mechanics of Reserve Manipulation

To understand the attack, imagine the pool as a scale with two pans: one with USDT, the other with LULA. The price is determined by the ratio of volumes. An ordinary trader can only move coins from one pan to another through swaps. The recycle() function allowed removing tokens from one pan, and sync() forced the scale to recognize the new, unbalanced position as fair.

According to data from analytical platforms, the sequence of actions was as follows:

  • A large swap of USDT for LULA, which artificially inflated the USDT reserve in the pair.
  • Multiple calls to recycle(), reducing the LULA reserve.
  • A reverse swap of a small amount of LULA, which ultimately "drained" the pool's liquidity.

The essence of the maneuver is simple: the fewer tokens remain on one pan of the scale, the more expensive each becomes. By artificially compressing the volume of LULA in the pool, the attacker exchanged a small number of tokens at a fictitiously inflated rate.

Preparation Lasted 12 Days

The attack was not spontaneous. Twelve days before the exploit, the hacker deployed auxiliary contracts to accumulate referral and team rewards. The prepared right to payouts became the entry point: the claimReward() → recycle() chain allowed maximizing the deflationary effect — reducing the number of tokens in circulation.

For the main phase, a flash loan of approximately $237 million was used. A flash loan works like money borrowed for a few seconds on good faith: the borrower must repay the amount within the same transaction, otherwise it is entirely canceled. No personal capital is needed for this, so such a tool is often used to amplify price manipulations. The borrowed funds were used to withdraw LULA from the DEX pool, enhancing the effect of the recycle() calls.

Expert opinion: This case is a classic example of a vulnerability in smart contract logic, not in the exchange's infrastructure. As long as token teams leave functions with privileged access to liquidity pools in the code, such attacks will repeat. Investors should pay attention to the token's code audit, not just the pool's liquidity.