A large-scale study by Block engineers has revealed critical vulnerabilities in Coldcard hardware wallets that allow attackers to steal users' bitcoins with high efficiency. The problem turned out to be far more serious than initially assumed: due to defects in random number generation, the number of possible keys was reduced to a magnitude that can be realistically brute-forced.
During an analysis initiated after a series of complaints about thefts from "non-native" wallets, Block specialists discovered that Coldcard devices of various generations — from Mk2 to Mk5, including the Mk3, Mk4, and Q models — contain two fundamental errors in the firmware. Notably, Block's own products, including Bitkey, were not affected, but the team decided to take responsibility for protecting the entire self-custody community.
Root of the problem: predictable "randomness"
In the Mk2 and Mk3 models, the random number generator worked incorrectly. Keys were created based on predictable data — the device identifier, timer state, and call history. This made the result completely deterministic. The newer Mk4, Q, and Mk5 models attempted to add entropy at boot, but here too the mechanism failed: the additional data was truncated to 32 bits, which catastrophically reduced the space of possible keys.
Analyst Quinten, commenting on the situation, provided a clear analogy. Normally, choosing the 12 words of a secret phrase is comparable to a giant lottery where the number of possible combinations is approximately 340 undecillion (that is, 340 with 36 zeros). Guessing the right option is practically impossible. However, due to the bug, the wallet essentially drew "tickets" from a tiny portion of that lottery. Instead of an astronomical number of options, the device selected from a few billion. This number is still large, but it is incomparable to the level of protection built into bitcoin.
The secret phrase itself looks completely normal — the words are taken from the standard BIP-39 list and raise no suspicion. But the attacker now needs to try millions of trillions of times fewer combinations. According to Block's estimates, draining one wallet took about an hour, and the attack is likely ongoing, affecting more and more addresses.
Even wallets with additional passphrase protection and multisignature setups were at risk if their keys were created on vulnerable devices.
My expert view: This is not just a technical incident, but a serious blow to trust in hardware security. This case is a stark reminder that even the most reliable devices are not immune to errors in the implementation of cryptographic protocols. Coldcard users need to immediately verify the origin of their keys and, at the slightest doubt, migrate to new addresses generated using verified software. The industry, in turn, should reconsider audit standards for random number generators in hardware wallets.