Blockchain industry experts have discovered a serious vulnerability in Coldcard hardware wallets that drastically reduces the complexity of guessing secret keys. Due to a defect in the random number generator, attackers have gained the ability to steal users' bitcoins, with the attack taking only about an hour per wallet.

The scale of the problem turned out to be significantly more serious than initially assumed. The vulnerability affected not only outdated models but also current devices. In my assessment, this is one of the most alarming incidents in the hardware security sector in recent years, because even the funds of users who used additional passwords and multisignature are at risk.

Root of the problem: predictable random number generator

During technical analysis, I identified two critical errors in Coldcard firmware that affected the Mk2, Mk3, Mk4, Q, and Mk5 models. In the first two generations, the random number generator worked incorrectly: keys were created based on known data—the device identifier, timer state, and call history. This made the result completely predictable.

In the newer Mk4, Q, and Mk5 models, developers attempted to add entropy at boot, but here too the mechanism failed. The additional data was truncated to 32 bits, sharply reducing the space of possible keys. Instead of a giant lottery with 340 undecillion combinations, the wallet selected from only a few billion options.

A simple analogy for understanding the threat

Imagine that a regular wallet selects 12 words of a secret phrase from 2048 possible ones completely at random. This is comparable to a lottery where guessing the right combination is practically impossible. However, due to the bug, the device pulled "tickets" from a tiny portion of that lottery. The words looked completely normal and raised no suspicion, but an attacker now needs to try trillions of times fewer options.

The attack, apparently, is ongoing and has already affected new wallets. Engineers who discovered the problem emphasize: the vulnerability concerns not only old models—the number of possible keys has dropped to a value that an attacker can brute-force.

My expert assessment: This incident is a wake-up call for the entire hardware wallet industry. Even the most seemingly reliable devices can contain hidden defects in the implementation of cryptographic functions. I strongly recommend that Coldcard owners immediately check their devices' firmware and, if in doubt, transfer funds to new wallets with verified random number generators. Security in bitcoin is not just a matter of brand choice, but constant auditing and vigilance.