A recent incident involving Coldcard hardware wallets, which led to losses exceeding $90 million, has exposed a systemic problem in approaches to independent testing of cryptographic hardware. Kraken exchange's Chief Security Officer, Nick Percoco, pointed to a fundamental gap: standard audit checks confirm the presence of a certified random number generator (TRNG) in the device, but do not guarantee that the working firmware actually utilizes this specific component rather than a vulnerable alternative.
The essence of the problem, which came to light at the end of July, is that users are asked to trust the manufacturer in implementing the most critical security function without being able to independently verify the correctness of the entire entropy generation path. This statement came amid an analysis of a vulnerability that had been present in Coldcard firmware for several years.
Technical details and scope of the vulnerability
As the technical analysis showed, the error was introduced into the codebase back in March 2021. Instead of the hardware TRNG, a weaker pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) from the MicroPython library was used when creating seed phrases. Notably, the production configuration actually disabled the hardware generator, and the check in the code only verified the presence of a macro rather than its activity. As a result, for a number of models (Mk2 and Mk3), the entropy of seed phrases dropped to a catastrophic ~40 bits, making them vulnerable to brute-force attacks. Even in newer models (Mk4, Mk5, Q), the entropy was only ~72 bits instead of the claimed 128, which also significantly reduces cryptographic strength.
The scale of the attacks turned out to be unprecedented. Initially, researchers recorded a wave of fund withdrawals from 1,196 addresses totaling 1,082.65 BTC (~$70.2 million) in just 41 minutes. Subsequent waves increased the total damage. Coinkite, the manufacturer of Coldcard, promptly halted shipments and destroyed warehouse stock with the vulnerable firmware, but for already sold devices, an update does not solve the problem — users need to create new seed phrases and migrate their funds.
A systemic challenge for the industry
This incident raises the question of the need to implement stricter testing standards, similar to those used in the payment industry or for government cryptographic modules (e.g., NIST SP 800-90B and BSI AIS-31). Existing certifications, such as Common Criteria, often do not cover the full cycle: from the physical source of randomness to its actual use in the final code running on the device.
Expert commentary: This case is a wake-up call for the entire hardware wallet ecosystem. It demonstrates that trust in a brand and the presence of formal certificates are not a guarantee of security. The industry needs to move toward more transparent and deeper audits that verify the actual behavior of firmware, not just its declared characteristics. Otherwise, we risk seeing a repeat of such disasters, undermining trust in the very concept of cold storage.