The recent incident with Coldcard hardware wallets has exposed a systemic problem that experts have long warned about: independent audits of these devices do not guarantee the actual security of their operation. Kraken's Chief Security Officer Nick Percoco directly pointed out this gap, emphasizing that standard checks cannot confirm the use of a validated random number generator in the actual firmware.
The core issue: trust versus verification
Auditors typically check for the presence of an approved random number generator (TRNG) in the device, but cannot confirm that the working firmware actually uses it. This is a critical discrepancy between stated specifications and actual code execution. Users are asked to trust the manufacturer in the most important security aspect—seed phrase generation—without independent confirmation that the entropy path works correctly.
Timeline and scale of the attack
The problem in seed phrase generation was discovered in firmware versions starting from March 2021. Due to an error in integrating a new cryptographic library, a weaker MicroPython pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) was used instead of the hardware TRNG. This resulted in the entropy of generated seed phrases being significantly lower than expected.
The scale of the damage was unprecedented. In just one wave of attacks, which occurred over 41 minutes, more than 1082 BTC (~$70 million) was drained. The total damage is estimated to exceed $90 million. Thousands of addresses were affected, and the attackers acted in an organized manner, indicating a high level of preparation.
Manufacturer's response and lessons for the industry
Coinkite, the manufacturer of Coldcard, responded promptly by halting device shipments and destroying remaining stock with the vulnerable firmware. However, a software update does not solve the problem of already compromised seed phrases. Users are strongly advised to migrate to new wallets by creating fresh seed phrases.
This incident raises a fundamental question about standards in the hardware wallet industry. Unlike the payment industry or cryptographic modules for government agencies, where mandatory independent verification of entropy sources exists, no such practice exists for hardware wallets. Existing certifications, such as Common Criteria, do not close this gap.
Expert comment: This case is not just a single vulnerability, but a systemic failure of trust. It shows that the hardware wallet industry must rethink its approach to auditing. Simply checking for the "presence" of components is not enough—a comprehensive analysis of the entire path from the randomness source to the executable code is needed. Otherwise, we risk facing new, even larger-scale incidents that will undermine faith in the security of cold storage as a whole.