The incident with Coldcard hardware wallets exposed a systemic problem that affects the entire industry: independent device certification does not guarantee that critical security components actually work as claimed. This conclusion directly follows from the analysis of a vulnerability that affected seed phrase generation and led to large-scale thefts.
The Core of the Problem: Trust vs. Reality
The root of the vulnerability lies in the discrepancy between what auditors check on paper and what actually happens in the real firmware. Specialists could confirm the presence of a hardware random number generator (TRNG) in the specification, but had no way to verify that the working software actually uses this component rather than a weaker alternative.
In the case of Coldcard, the error was introduced into the code back in March 2021. Instead of a cryptographically secure TRNG, the firmware used a predictable pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) from the MicroPython library. Technical analysis showed that due to a configuration error, the build activated the fallback Yasmarang generator, leading to a catastrophic reduction in the entropy of generated seed phrases — in some models down to 40 bits instead of the required 128.
Attack Scale and Affected Devices
The problem affected a wide range of devices: from Mk2 and Mk3 with firmware 4.x to the newer Mk4, Mk5, and Q. In the latter, the situation was somewhat better — entropy was about 72 bits, but this is still insufficient to protect against targeted attacks. Coinkite promptly halted shipments and destroyed devices with vulnerable firmware, but the damage had already been done.
Analysis showed that attackers carried out a series of coordinated attacks, draining funds from vulnerable addresses. In just 41 minutes on July 30, over 1,082 BTC (~$70 million) was withdrawn. In total, including subsequent waves, losses exceeded $90 million, affecting thousands of addresses.
The Industry Needs New Standards
This case demonstrates that the existing practice of certifying hardware wallets is outdated. Checking for the presence of components and manufacturer-paid audits do not close the main gap — the lack of verification of the full data path from the entropy source to the executable code. While traditional payment systems and government cryptographic modules have strict standards (NIST, BSI), the crypto wallet industry relies on the integrity of the manufacturer.
My expert opinion: This incident is a wake-up call for the entire ecosystem. Self-verification of backup copies and the use of additional entropy (e.g., physical dice rolls) are no longer paranoia but have become a necessary precaution. Until mandatory and independent checks of the full key generation cycle are implemented, users should be cautious about trusting even the most well-known hardware wallet brands.