On July 29, the FSB placed Pavel Durov on the international wanted list. The formal pretext is aiding terrorism. Allegedly, Telegram's administration systematically failed to remove channels, chats, and bots that, according to the investigation, were used by Ukrainian intelligence services to coordinate attacks and recruit perpetrators. This is already the second major legal front for the messenger's founder, and, by all appearances, the prosecution's framework faces the same fundamental problems as the French case.
Platform liability versus personal intent
The key issue here is not the presence of prohibited content, but the ability to prove a direct link between the service's operation and Durov's conscious decision not to intervene. A mere statement that the platform did not remove certain materials is not proof of personal involvement. To charge complicity or conspiracy, the investigation must demonstrate three things: whether Durov knew about specific violations, whether he received official requests to suppress them, and whether he made a deliberate decision to ignore them.
Indicative is the benchmark used by the defense in similar cases—the trial against the founder of the crypto exchange Bitzlato, Anatoly Legkodymov. The U.S. investigation secured a guilty plea not based on assumptions, but thanks to internal correspondence where the businessman directly called the platform's users "known fraudsters." This was not hypothetical awareness, but documented knowledge. In the Telegram case, the public part of the Russian investigation so far contains nothing comparable.
Political gesture or procedural reality?
The French investigation, which has been ongoing for almost two years, has so far failed to present convincing evidence of the founder's personal guilt. The charges are built on the platform's systematic refusal to cooperate with authorities, which is an attempt to transform the operator's responsibility for infrastructure into the personal responsibility of its head. In this context, the new Russian case looks more like a political signal than a procedural initiative coordinated with Paris. As early as February, Durov publicly stated that Russian authorities "come up with new pretexts every day" to restrict access to Telegram.
Wanted list and extradition: real risks
Being placed on the international wanted list is not a verdict. The Interpol mechanism directly prohibits interference in matters of a political nature (Article 3 of its Constitution). The precedent with William Browder is telling: Russia repeatedly sought the publication of a Red Notice, but Interpol's commission rejected the requests, recognizing the prosecution as politically motivated. However, even a rejected notice can remain in national databases and lead to short-term detention, as happened in Spain in 2018. Therefore, efforts to remove data from the database must be undertaken before a possible arrest, not after.
Expert conclusion
We are witnessing a global reassessment of technology platforms' liability, and the Durov case is a litmus test for this process. While courts on both sides of the Atlantic debate where infrastructure liability ends and the personal criminal liability of its creator begins, the industry pays for this uncertainty. The practical lesson for owners of crypto exchanges and messengers is obvious: compliance and documented responses to requests are not bureaucracy, but the only real defense against accusations of complicity. A few careless phrases in internal correspondence can become decisive evidence of intent, as happened in the Bitzlato case.