The quantum race between the world's leading powers is entering a fundamentally new level. Export control in this sphere is no longer just a defensive tool—it is turning into an active element of industrial strategy, allowing the architecture of the future market to be shaped before it even emerges. In my analysis, based on the latest research from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a clear trend is visible: the United States and its allies are applying so-called "anticipatory deterrence."

Control shifts to supply chains

The key shift is that restrictions are being imposed not on finished quantum computers, but on critical components and dual-use technologies. Analysts highlight several "bottlenecks" in global supply chains that are becoming the main points of pressure. These include cryogenic systems, isotopically enriched silicon-28, and control electronics. For example, the production of superconducting quantum systems, which require cooling to temperatures close to absolute zero, is concentrated in the hands of only a few companies, such as Finland's Bluefors and the UK's Oxford Instruments.

It is precisely these critical nodes that allow licensing restrictions to be applied effectively. However, no single country controls the entire supply chain, which creates room for maneuver.

Restrictions do not solve everything

My analysis shows that export control is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it slows down competitors' access to advanced technologies. On the other, it stimulates the development of domestic alternatives. Chinese organizations have already accelerated work on domestic dilution refrigerators and materials for quantum applications, confirming the risk of a backlash effect.

Barriers work as a source of delays and additional costs, but not as a complete ban. Therefore, as emphasized in the study, "the decisive question is no longer which technologies to ban, but which nodes of one's own ecosystem to support."

China formalizes standards

Notably, China established a quantum information standardization committee, MIIT/TC10, in June. This is not just a bureaucratic step—Beijing is developing not only research but also technical rules for commercialization. Standards are critically important for equipment compatibility, testing, and procurement, and at the international level they allow influence over how future technologies will be designed.

Earlier, analysts from the Special Competitive Studies Project noted that the United States retains a slight advantage over China in the quantum race, but the gap is rapidly narrowing. IBM has also called on states to expand quantum strategies, considering not only computing but also communication, sensors, and post-quantum cryptography.

My conclusion: We are witnessing a transition from an arms race in the quantum sphere to a race of ecosystems. The winner will not be the one who builds the most powerful quantum computer, but the one who establishes a sustainable industrial base and standards that will define the rules of the game for everyone else.