An analysis of the recent Coldcard hardware wallet hack leads to a paradoxical conclusion: users could have saved their funds if the Bitcoin community had adopted proposals a decade ago that were never implemented. This refers to the concept of "vaults," which was described as early as 2016 but never gained support in the protocol.
At the center of the discussion is work proposed by Malte Möser, Ittay Eyal, and Emin Gün Sirer. They described how a small change to Bitcoin's scripting language would allow for the creation of wallets resistant to hacking. The idea was to build the right to make mistakes into the wallet's design: instead of trying to create a perfect self-preservation system, the authors proposed making the consequences of an error reversible.
How vaults and covenants work
The logic of this design rests on a simple assumption: humans are imperfect and will eventually make mistakes. Covenants are predefined conditions for spending funds: they determine to which address and under what circumstances coins will be sent. A vault works precisely through such a restriction—it is impossible to withdraw money bypassing the specified scenario, even if the keys fall into the hands of a third party.
Technically, a vault adds a delay to the transfer. The hardware wallet does not send the transaction immediately but after 24 hours. During these 24 hours, the owner sees the operation and can intercept it. If the transfer looks suspicious and it seems the wallet has been compromised, the user presses a special button—and the funds go not to the attacker but to a backup address, for example, an exchange deposit.
In my assessment, such a scheme does not create dependence on a third party in everyday life. The backup address only activates in a hacking scenario, and during normal operation, the exchange has no control over the wallet. The cost of such protection is time: the sender must wait 24 hours for each transfer, which is inconvenient for everyday payments but acceptable for long-term storage.
Similar designs have long been operating outside Bitcoin. Institutional-level solutions—Safe in the EVM ecosystem and Squads on Solana—protect assets worth over $100 billion and are considered the standard there for large companies.
Why Bitcoin still does not have this
Launching vaults on the Bitcoin network requires protocol upgrades—proposals like OP_CTV, OP_VAULT, or OP_CAT. Without them, the described scheme is unfeasible. Over the years, these ideas have been promoted by developers James O'Beirne, Jeremy Rubin, Bryan Bishop, and Eli Ben-Sasson, as well as the author of the mentioned analysis themselves. This has yielded no results.
I see the reason not in the technology. Upgrades are blocked by community politics and biased attitudes toward the authors of proposals, not by substantive objections to the designs themselves. This is precisely what is linked to the losses of Coldcard owners: had covenants existed, many holders would have been advised to use such a storage method, and the money would have remained with them.
The main argument of supporters lies in the very structure of the scheme. Vaults and covenants do not require perfection from wallets and people but instead start from the opposite premise. No one will make such a mechanism mandatory: the choice should remain with the holder. Those who do not need such protection will continue to operate as before, but others will have the option to enable it.
My conclusion: the Bitcoin community is paying a high price for conservatism. While other networks implement advanced security mechanisms, Bitcoin remains vulnerable to attacks that could have been neutralized years ago. It is time to reconsider the approach to upgrades; otherwise, losses will repeat.