The recent incident involving the hacking of Coldcard hardware wallets has once again raised a question that the Bitcoin community has been trying to ignore for nearly a decade. Analyst Udi Wertheimer reminded the public of a 2016 paper that described the concept of "vaults" for Bitcoin. Had this protocol been implemented, owners of the affected wallets could have preserved their funds.
The discussion centers on proposals by Malte Möser, Ittai Eyal, and Emin Gün Sirer. They described how a small change to Bitcoin's scripting language would enable the creation of wallets resistant to hacking. Nearly ten years later, these ideas have still not been implemented on the main network.
How Vaults and Covenants Work
The logic of the 2016 paper rests on a simple assumption: humans are imperfect and will inevitably make mistakes sooner or later. The authors proposed building the right to err into the wallet's very design, rather than attempting to create a perfect self-custody system.
Covenants are predefined conditions for spending funds. They determine to which address and under what circumstances a coin will be sent. A vault works precisely through such restrictions—it is impossible to withdraw money bypassing the specified scenario, even if the keys fall into the hands of a third party.
Technically, a vault adds a delay to transfers. Wertheimer describes it as follows: the hardware wallet does not send the transaction immediately but rather after a day. Within 24 hours, the owner sees the operation and can intercept it. If the transfer looks suspicious and appears to indicate a compromised wallet, the user presses a special button—and the funds go not to the attacker but to a backup address, such as a deposit on the Coinbase exchange.
According to the analyst, the scheme does not create dependence on a third party in everyday life. The backup address only activates in a hacking scenario, and under normal operation, the exchange has no control over the wallet.
The cost of such protection is time. The sender must wait a day for each transfer, which is inconvenient for everyday payments but acceptable for long-term storage.
Similar constructions have long been in use outside Bitcoin. As the analyst notes, institutional-level solutions—Safe in the EVM ecosystem and Squads on Solana—protect assets worth over $100 billion and are considered the standard there for major companies.
Why Bitcoin Still Lacks This
Launching vaults on the Bitcoin network requires protocol upgrades—proposals such as OP_CTV, OP_VAULT, or OP_CAT. Without them, the described scheme is unfeasible. Over the years, these ideas have been promoted by developers James O'Beirne, Jeremy Rubin, Bryan Bishop, and Eli Ben-Sasson, as well as Wertheimer himself. This has yielded no results.
The analyst sees the reason not in technology. According to him, upgrades are blocked by community politics and biased attitudes toward the authors of proposals, rather than substantive objections to the constructions themselves. Wertheimer links the losses of Coldcard owners precisely to this. He emphasized that with covenants in place, many holders would have been advised to use such a storage method, and their money would have remained with them.
The main argument of supporters lies in the very design of the scheme. Vaults and covenants do not require perfection from wallets and people but instead start from the opposite premise.
No one will make such a mechanism mandatory. Wertheimer insists that the choice should remain with the holder: those who do not need such protection will continue to operate as before, but others will have the option to enable it.
My comment: This situation is a vivid example of how the conservatism of the Bitcoin community slows down the adoption of critically important security mechanisms. While in other networks multisignature and covenants have become the de facto standard, Bitcoin continues to rely on user discipline. The Coldcard incident will not be the last, and each such case will cost the community trust and real money.