An analysis of the recent Coldcard hardware wallet hack brings to the surface a long-standing gap in Bitcoin's security. Back in 2016, researchers proposed an elegant solution — "vaults" — that could have made such attacks useless. But the protocol never adopted the concept, and now we are reaping the consequences.
This refers to the work done by Malte Möser, Ittay Eyal, and Emin Gün Sirer. They described how a small change to Bitcoin's scripting language would allow the creation of wallets resistant to hacking even if keys are compromised. Almost ten years have passed — and these ideas have remained gathering dust on the shelf of history.
How vaults and covenants work
The logic of that 2016 work rests on a simple assumption: humans are imperfect and will eventually make a mistake, and the consequences of such a slip should be reversible. Instead of trying to build a perfect self-custody system, the authors proposed building the right to err into the wallet's very design.
Covenants are pre-defined conditions for spending funds: they determine to which address and under what circumstances a coin will go. A vault works precisely through such a restriction — funds cannot be withdrawn bypassing the specified scenario, even if the keys fall into the hands of a third party.
Technically, a vault adds a delay to the transfer. The hardware wallet does not send the transaction immediately, but after a day. Within 24 hours, the owner sees the operation and can intercept it. If the transfer looks suspicious and it seems the wallet has been hacked, the user presses a special button — and the funds go not to the attacker, but to a backup address, for example, a Coinbase exchange deposit.
In my assessment, the scheme does not create dependence on a third party in everyday life. The backup address only activates in a hacking scenario, and during normal operation, the exchange has no control over the wallet.
The price of such protection is time. The sender is required to wait a day for each transfer, which is inconvenient for everyday payments but acceptable for long-term storage.
Similar designs have long been in use outside Bitcoin. Institutional-level solutions — Safe in the EVM ecosystem and Squads in Solana — protect assets worth over $100 billion and are considered the standard there for major companies.
Why Bitcoin still does not have this
Launching vaults on the Bitcoin network requires protocol upgrades — proposals like OP_CTV, OP_VAULT, or OP_CAT. Without them, the described scheme is unfeasible.
Over the years, these ideas have been promoted by developers James O'Beirne, Jeremy Rubin, Bryan Bishop, and Eli Ben-Sasson, as well as analyst Udi Wertheimer himself. It has yielded no results.
I see the reason not in the technology. Updates are blocked by community politics and bias toward the authors of proposals, not by substantive objections to the designs themselves.
It is to this that Wertheimer attributes the losses of Coldcard owners. He emphasizes: if covenants existed, many holders would have been advised to use such a storage method, and the money would have stayed with them.
The main argument of supporters lies in the very design of the scheme. Vaults and covenants do not require perfection from wallets and people, but rather start from the opposite assumption.
No one will make such a mechanism mandatory. Wertheimer insists that the choice should remain with the holder: those who do not need such protection will continue to work as before, but others will have the option to enable it.
My conclusion: the Coldcard incident is not just a story about one wallet, but a systemic signal. Bitcoin has been conservative on upgrades for decades, and this caution has its price. While the community argues about the purity of the protocol, users lose real money. Perhaps it is time to reconsider priorities.