The quantum race between the world's leading economies is reaching a new level: export controls have ceased to be merely a protective barrier and have become a full-fledged tool of industrial strategy. In my analysis of the latest trends, it is clearly evident how the United States and its allies are applying an approach that could be called "preemptive deterrence"—they are trying not just to limit competitors' access to sensitive developments, but also to shape in advance the architecture of the future quantum industry.

Control Has Shifted to Supply Chains

The key difference in the current situation is that restrictions are being introduced long before a mature commercial market takes shape. Not only finished quantum computers are coming under attack, but also critically important components: cryogenic systems, isotopically enriched silicon-28, control electronics, and specialized software. Of particular interest are the "bottlenecks" in supply chains—for example, superconducting cooling systems that reach temperatures close to absolute zero, which are produced on an industrial scale by only a few companies, including Finland's Bluefors and the UK's Oxford Instruments.

It is precisely these critical points that make it possible to apply licensing restrictions with maximum effectiveness. However, it is important to understand: no single country controls the entire quantum supply chain, which creates natural limits to such pressure.

Restrictions Do Not Solve Everything

Export controls can slow competitors' access to individual technologies, but they cannot stop their development. The broader the supplier base, the more restrictions act as a source of delays and additional costs rather than a complete ban. There is also an obvious risk of a backlash effect: barriers spur competitors to develop their own analogues. Chinese organizations have already accelerated work on domestic dilution refrigerators and materials for quantum applications.

Therefore, export controls by themselves do not guarantee technological leadership—they must be combined with industrial policy, investment screening, and support for companies occupying strategic positions. As is rightly noted in analytical circles, "the decisive question is no longer which technologies to ban, but which nodes of one's own ecosystem to support."

China Is Shaping Standards

It is telling that China is actively moving in this direction. In June, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology established a quantum information standardization committee, MIIT/TC10, which will be tasked with developing industry standards in the areas of basic quantum technologies, computing, communication, and high-precision measurement. This fits into Beijing's broader strategy: developing not only research but also the technical rules necessary for commercialization.

Standards are critically important for equipment interoperability, terminology, testing, and procurement. At the international level, they allow states and companies to influence how future technologies will be designed and used. Previously, analysts noted that the United States retains a slight advantage over China in the quantum race, but the gap is rapidly narrowing. IBM has also called on governments to expand quantum strategies, taking into account not only computing but also communication, sensors, post-quantum cryptography, workforce, and supply chains.

My conclusion: the quantum race has finally moved from the realm of pure scientific achievements into the sphere of geopolitical engineering. Success will be determined not so much by processor power as by the ability to build sustainable ecosystems that combine control, standardization, and industrial support. Investors and market participants should closely monitor regulatory initiatives—they will become the main driver of the redistribution of power in this industry.