In global politics, quantum technologies have ceased to be an exclusively scientific domain—they have now become an arena of strategic rivalry. My analysis of international trends shows that export controls in this field are increasingly used not as a defensive tool, but as an active element of industrial strategy. This is a fundamentally new approach that I would characterize as "preemptive deterrence"—an attempt not just to limit competitors' access to sensitive developments, but also to shape in advance the architecture of the future quantum industry.
Control shifts to supply chains
The key difference between the current situation and classic export restrictions is the introduction of measures before a mature commercial market has formed. This concerns not only ready-made quantum computers, but also critically important components: cryogenic systems, isotopically enriched silicon-28, and control electronics. These elements are produced by a limited circle of suppliers—for example, Finland's Bluefors and the UK's Oxford Instruments dominate the creation of cooling systems to temperatures close to absolute zero, which is necessary for superconducting machines.
It is precisely such "bottlenecks" in supply chains that become effective points of pressure. However, it is important to emphasize: no single country controls the entire quantum ecosystem. This creates both opportunities and risks.
Restrictions are not a panacea
My analysis shows that export barriers can slow down competitors' progress, but not stop it. The more diversified the supplier base, the more restrictions act as a factor of delays and additional costs rather than a complete ban. Moreover, there is an obvious risk of a backlash effect: barriers stimulate the development of domestic alternatives. Already, Chinese organizations have accelerated work on domestic dilution refrigerators and materials for quantum applications.
Export control by itself does not guarantee technological leadership. It must be combined with industrial policy, investment screening, and support for companies occupying strategic positions. As I often emphasize in my reviews, the decisive question is no longer which technologies to ban, but which nodes of one's own ecosystem to support.
China: standards as a weapon
Special attention deserves the initiative of China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which established in June the quantum information standardization committee MIIT/TC10. This is not just a bureaucratic step—Beijing is actively shaping technical rules for quantum computing, communication, and measurement. Standards are critically important for equipment interoperability, testing, and procurement, and at the international level they allow influencing how future technologies will be designed and used.
Earlier, my colleagues from the Special Competitive Studies Project noted that the United States retains a slight advantage over China in the quantum race, but the gap is narrowing. Countries' positions are determined not only by scientific achievements, but also by industrial potential, talent, and government levers. IBM's call to expand quantum strategies to include communication, sensors, and post-quantum cryptography looks timely—but only time will tell who can turn control and standards into real leadership.
My expert opinion: in the long term, the winner will not be the one who imposes more restrictions, but the one who creates a sustainable innovation ecosystem. Export control is merely a tool, not a strategy; effective players have already understood this, and that is precisely why the quantum race is entering a new level—the level of industrial and regulatory diplomacy.