I managed to obtain exclusive details of an investigation that has reshaped the understanding of the scale of North Korea's cyber army operations. Cybersecurity expert Vangelis Stykas, CTO of the company Kumio, maintained covert access to the servers of one of North Korea's hacker groups for 22 months. The results of his work, presented at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, are shocking: the attackers infiltrated the networks of 1,640 companies across 57 countries, with 800 cases involving critical breaches that granted root access to servers and access to cloud infrastructure.

How the researcher infiltrated the enemy's camp

Stykas does not disclose the exact method of the breach due to the sensitivity of the data, but it is known that some operators accidentally infected their own computers with their own malicious code. This allowed him to connect to the hackers' command servers and gain access to their workstations, corporate Slack and Discord channels. In total, the expert examined approximately 5 terabytes of data, identifying victims through developer keys, source code, and other digital traces.

Among the confirmed victims are Boston Children's Hospital, Japan's AEON Smart Technology, smartphone manufacturer Oppo, crypto exchanges Coinbase and Uniswap Labs, Italy's High Council of the Judiciary, Al Rajhi Bank (a subsidiary), and the government of Flanders. The organizations' responses varied: Flemish authorities isolated workstations and changed passwords, while Coinbase terminated its contract with a contractor within 30 days of hiring.

Fake job postings and the hunt for crypto wallets

The attack scheme was uniform: developers were offered a high-paying job and then asked to download a test assignment that contained malicious code. This tactic, known as Contagious Interview, has been used by North Korean groups since 2022. External contractors with access to the infrastructure of dozens of clients simultaneously pose a particular danger — some of them held keys to 30 companies.

Notably, the hackers acted selectively: despite having access to medical data and judicial registries, they ignored this information, focusing exclusively on finding cryptocurrency wallets and private keys. According to expert estimates, hundreds of trained operators work in North Korea, while thousands of remote IT specialists are required to meet strict annual revenue targets.

The main risk now is the silence of most victims. Hundreds of organizations have not responded to warnings, and the list of affected parties continues to grow every day. This is a systemic problem that requires an immediate reassessment of cybersecurity approaches, especially in the crypto industry, where North Korean hackers remain one of the most serious threats.

My comment: This case is a stark reminder that even the most protected companies are vulnerable through the human factor and the supply chain. Crypto exchanges and DeFi protocols should view the threat from North Korea not as abstract, but as an operational reality requiring the implementation of strict contractor verification protocols and multi-factor authentication at all levels of access.