The scale of the cyber threat from North Korea turned out to be far more serious than commonly believed. Cybersecurity expert Vangelis Stykas managed not only to track the actions of the hacker group but also to gain direct access to their command servers and maintain it for 22 months. The results of this investigation, presented at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, are shocking: the attackers infiltrated the networks of 1,640 companies across 57 countries, with 800 cases involving critical breaches that granted root access to servers and access to cloud infrastructure.

Stykas, CTO of Kumio, exploited a mistake made by the hackers themselves: some operators accidentally infected their own computers with malicious code. This gave him access to workstations, corporate Slack and Discord channels, and approximately 5 terabytes of data. By analyzing developer keys, source code, and digital traces, he compiled a list of victims, which included Boston Children's Hospital, smartphone manufacturer Oppo, crypto exchange Coinbase and Uniswap Labs, the High Council of Justice of Italy, Al Rajhi Bank, and the government of Flanders.

The reaction of organizations to the warnings varied. Flanders isolated workstations and changed passwords, while Coinbase terminated its contract with a contractor within a month. However, the main problem is the silence of hundreds of other victims who never responded to the notifications.

The attack method has remained unchanged since 2022: hackers offer developers high-paying job vacancies, then ask them to download a test assignment that turns out to be malicious. External contractors with access to the infrastructure of dozens of clients simultaneously pose a particular danger—some of them worked with 30 companies.

Cryptocurrency trail and selectivity

Notably, the hackers act selectively. Having access to medical data and judicial registries, they ignored this information, focusing exclusively on searching for cryptocurrency wallets and private keys. This confirms that the main goal is financial gain, not espionage.

According to analysts, hundreds of trained operators work in North Korea, with thousands of IT specialists involved remotely, for whom strict revenue targets are set. Experts warn that as long as access to compromised networks remains, other groups may connect to them for espionage.

My analysis: This situation is a wake-up call for the entire crypto industry. Vulnerability through contractors and phishing job offers remains one of the most effective attacks, and the silence of most victims only exacerbates the risks. Companies need to reconsider their policies for working with external developers and implement multi-factor authentication for access to critical infrastructure, otherwise the list of victims will only grow.