Renowned researcher and blogger Cole conducted a bold public experiment that exposed a troubling reality regarding the use of hardware cryptocurrency wallets. He generated a secret phrase on a Coldcard Mk3 device and created five wallets, funding each with an identical amount of satoshis. The goal was to test how quickly attackers could detect and withdraw funds from vulnerable addresses.
The entire process was documented on video to ensure maximum transparency. The test was prompted by a recent high-profile incident involving Coldcard compromise, which had already caused a stir in the crypto community.
Methodology and Test Parameters
For the experiment, a Coldcard Mk3 model with firmware version 4.1.8 was used, which the researcher considers the most vulnerable. Notably, the issue also affects newer models — Mk4, Mk5, and Q. The device automatically generated a new secret phrase, from which five wallet variants were created:
- Standard — without an additional passphrase.
- With passphrase (1 word) — one word from the standard BIP39 list.
- With passphrase (2 words) — two words from the BIP39 list.
- With passphrase (3 words) — three words from the BIP39 list.
- With account number — an arbitrary account number.
The fourth variant with a word combination was replaced by testing the account number to assess the activity of brute-forcing non-zero profiles. The Coldcard system supports values from 1 to 9999. For the sake of a clean experiment, identical parameters were set: the bc1q address standard, a unified key derivation path, funding of 10,800 satoshis per address, and sending all funds in a single common transaction.
Results: Instant Theft
The base wallet without a passphrase lost its balance almost instantly. When opening the mempool explorer, the transferred funds had already been moved to a new unknown address. This means hackers had pre-loaded compromised keys into an auto-bot that reacts lightning-fast to any deposit. The researcher deliberately declined to recover the funds via the RBF mechanism to maintain the experiment's full integrity, so the launch of a "hot" wallet was canceled.
The remaining four accounts remained untouched, including the wallet with a non-zero account number. However, the secret phrase itself is considered fully compromised, and monitoring of address activity continues in real time.
My analysis: This experiment is a stark reminder that even hardware isolation does not save you when passphrase protection is weak. Using a BIP39 passphrase is not just a recommendation but a critically important barrier that turns a stolen seed phrase into useless garbage. Neglecting this rule is a direct path to losing funds, and this test vividly demonstrates the speed of automated scanners.