I managed to obtain exclusive data on a large-scale operation by North Korean cybercriminals. Cybersecurity expert Vangelis Stykas, CTO of the company Kumio, maintained access to the servers of a North Korean hacker group for 22 months. The results of his investigation, presented at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, are shocking: the attackers infiltrated the networks of 1,640 companies across 57 countries, with 800 cases involving critical breaches.

The hackers gained root access to servers and full access to the victims' cloud infrastructure. Stykas does not disclose the exact method of penetrating the attackers' systems for security reasons, but it is known that some operators accidentally infected their own computers with malicious code. This became the entry point for the researcher.

How the scale of the attack was uncovered

Having gained access to the command servers, Stykas examined approximately 5 terabytes of data, including the hackers' corporate Slack and Discord channels. He identified victims through leaked developer keys, source code, and other digital traces. Among the affected are Boston Children's Hospital, Japan's AEON Smart Technology, smartphone manufacturer Oppo, crypto exchange Coinbase and Uniswap Labs, Italy's High Council of the Judiciary, Al Rajhi Bank, and the government of Flanders.

The organizations' reactions to the notifications were mixed. The Flemish authorities isolated workstations and changed passwords, while Boston Children's Hospital only reported the infection of a contractor's personal device. Coinbase terminated the contractor's contract 30 days after hiring, but some companies completely ignored the warnings.

The Contagious Interview scheme and the threat to the crypto industry

The method of infiltration is identical in all cases: developers were offered a high-paying job and then asked to download a test assignment that contained malicious code. This tactic, known as Contagious Interview, has been used by North Korean groups since 2022. The main danger is external contractors who have access to the infrastructure of multiple clients simultaneously. Some of them had keys to 30 companies.

Notably, the hackers acted selectively: having access to medical data and judicial registries, they ignored them, focusing exclusively on searching for cryptocurrency wallets and private keys. This confirms that the main goal is financial gain, not espionage.

The scale of the threat is underestimated: hundreds of victims never responded to the warnings, and the list of affected parties continues to grow. Hundreds of trained operators with strict annual revenue targets work in North Korea, and as long as most companies remain silent, the risk of repeated attacks remains extremely high.

My analysis: The situation demonstrates a critical vulnerability in the supply chain of the crypto industry. Even major exchanges like Coinbase are not protected from attacks through contractors. I recommend that all companies working with digital assets conduct an audit of third-party developer access and implement multi-factor authentication for all external connections.