I managed to obtain exclusive data on a large-scale operation against North Korean hackers. Cybersecurity expert Vangelis Stykas, CTO of Kumio, spent 22 months maintaining access to the servers of the DPRK hacker group. The results of his work, presented at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, are shocking: the cyber army infiltrated the networks of 1,640 companies across 57 countries, with 800 cases involving critical breaches—attackers gained root access to servers and access to cloud infrastructure.
How the researcher infiltrated the attackers' infrastructure
Stykas does not disclose the exact method of the breach, citing the sensitivity of the information. However, it is known that some operators accidentally infected their own computers with their own malware, giving the researcher access to the hackers' workstations. He obtained corporate Slack and Discord channels, as well as about 5 terabytes of data. After examining the dumps, he identified victims by development keys, source code, and other digital traces.
Among the victims are Boston Children's Hospital, Japanese technology company AEON Smart Technology, smartphone manufacturer Oppo, crypto exchange Coinbase and Uniswap Labs, Italy's High Council of the Judiciary, a subsidiary of Al Rajhi Bank, and the government of Flanders. The organizations' responses varied: Flanders isolated the workstation and changed passwords after being notified by the Belgian Cyber Security Centre, while Coinbase terminated a contractor's contract 30 days after his hiring.
Fake job postings and the hunt for crypto wallets
The attack scheme was uniform: developers were offered a high-paying job and then asked to download a test assignment containing malicious code. This tactic, known as Contagious Interview, has been used since 2022. The main threat comes from external contractors who have access to the infrastructure of multiple clients simultaneously—some had access to 30 companies.
Notably, the hackers acted selectively: having access to Americans' medical data and a criminal records registry, they ignored this information, focusing on finding crypto wallets and private keys. Marcus Hutchins from Expel considers this cold comfort, since other groups could connect to the compromised networks for espionage.
The scale of the operation is confirmed by a Dtex report: hundreds of trained operators work in the DPRK, and thousands of IT specialists work remotely, with strict annual revenue targets set for them. The main risk is the silence of most victims: hundreds of organizations have not responded to warnings, and the list of affected parties continues to grow every day.
My analysis: This leak is a rare case where we see the inner workings of North Korean hackers. The fact that they ignore sensitive data in favor of crypto confirms that their main motivation is financial. But the victims' silence is an alarming signal: many companies still do not realize that their networks are already compromised, and this makes them vulnerable to future attacks.