A large-scale operation by the North Korean cyber army has been dealt a blow: Vangelis Stykas, CTO of cybersecurity firm Kumio, maintained access to the servers of the DPRK hacker group for 22 months. As a result, he managed to compile a detailed list of victims — 1,640 companies from 57 countries, with 800 cases involving critical breaches.

Stykas presented the findings of his investigation at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas. According to his data, the attackers gained root access to servers and access to victims' cloud infrastructure, indicating an unprecedented level of penetration.

How the researcher infiltrated the attackers' infrastructure

Stykas keeps his method of infiltration secret due to the sensitivity of the information. It is only known that some operators of the hacker group accidentally infected their own computers with malware, which opened the door for the researcher to access their workstations. He gained access to corporate Slack and Discord channels, as well as about 5 terabytes of data.

By identifying victims through developer keys, source code, and other digital traces, Stykas contacted representatives of the compromised organizations. Among the confirmed victims:

  • Boston Children's Hospital (healthcare)
  • AEON Smart Technology (technology, Japan)
  • Oppo (smartphone manufacturing)
  • Coinbase and Uniswap Labs (cryptocurrency)
  • The High Council of Justice of Italy (public sector)
  • Al Rajhi Bank (finance, subsidiary)
  • Digitaal Vlaanderen (Flemish government)

The organizations' responses varied: the Flemish government isolated workstations and changed passwords, Boston Children's Hospital reported infection of a contractor's personal device, and Coinbase terminated a contractor's contract 30 days after hiring. However, many companies did not respond to inquiries at all.

Fake job postings and the hunt for crypto assets

The infiltration scheme was identical in all cases: developers were offered a high-paying job, then asked to download a test assignment containing malicious code. This tactic, known as Contagious Interview, has been used by DPRK groups since 2022.

External contractors with access to the infrastructure of multiple clients at once pose a particular danger — some of them worked with 30 companies simultaneously. At the same time, the hackers acted selectively: having access to medical data and court registries, they ignored them, focusing exclusively on finding cryptocurrency wallets and private keys.

Security expert Marcus Hutchins from Expel considers such focus to be little consolation: as long as network access remains, another group could connect to it for espionage. The scale of the threat is also confirmed by a Dtex report: hundreds of trained operators work in the DPRK, along with thousands of remote IT specialists who are held to strict annual revenue targets.

My analysis: The main risk here is the silence of most victims. Hundreds of organizations have not responded to warnings, and the list of victims continues to grow. The crypto industry should treat this as a wake-up call: North Korean hackers operate systematically, and their main goal is digital assets. Ignoring the threat only increases their profits.