I have long said that hardware wallets are not a panacea, but merely one layer of protection. A recent public experiment conducted by the well-known researcher Cole clearly confirmed this axiom. He decided to test how quickly attackers could drain a wallet created on a Coldcard Mk3 device with outdated firmware. The results were both predictable and shocking.
Test Methodology: Five Wallets, One Scenario
For the purity of the experiment, the researcher generated a secret phrase on a Coldcard Mk3 with firmware version 4.1.8, which he rightly considers the most vulnerable. Based on this phrase, he created five different wallets, each with a unique protection configuration: from a standard one (without an additional password) to variants with a password of one, two, and three words from the BIP39 list, as well as with an arbitrary account number.
All wallets used a single bc1q address standard, the same key derivation path, and were funded with 10,800 satoshis each. An interesting detail: when attempting to directly export public keys to the Sparrow program, the device suddenly stopped responding to commands, forcing the researcher to resort to saving data to an SD card. This already indicates the instability of the old software.
Shocking Result: Instant Collapse of Basic Protection
The results of the experiment were more than telling. The wallet without a password was drained almost instantly. As soon as the researcher opened the mempool explorer, the funds had already been moved to a new unknown address. This means that hackers had pre-loaded compromised keys into automated bots that scan the blockchain and react instantly to any transaction.
The other four wallets—with passwords and a non-standard account number—remained untouched. However, the very fact that a basic secret phrase without additional protection is completely vulnerable should make every crypto asset holder think twice. The researcher deliberately refused to recover the funds via the RBF mechanism to maintain the purity of the experiment and continues to monitor the activity of these addresses in real time.
My Analysis and Conclusions
This experiment is not just a story about a specific Coldcard model. It is a signal to the entire market. The problem affects not only the Mk3 but also the newer Mk4, Mk5, and Q models. The main conclusion is simple: a hardware wallet without an enabled additional passphrase is an open door for automated attacks. In an era when attackers use bots and compromised databases, relying solely on a seed phrase is an unforgivable luxury. Enable additional passwords, use non-standard derivation paths, and always remember: your security is not about purchasing a device, but about your habits and settings.