In the world of cryptocurrencies and high technology, threats often come from the most unexpected places. My new analysis reveals an unprecedented case: the Chief Technology Officer of Kumio, cybersecurity specialist Vangelis Stikas, spent 22 months covertly maintaining access to the servers of a North Korean hacker group. The results of his work, presented at the Black Hat conference in Las Vegas, are shocking in scale: the DPRK's cyber army infiltrated the networks of 1,640 companies across 57 countries, with 800 cases involving critical breaches—attackers gained root access to servers and full control over cloud infrastructure.

How the researcher penetrated enemy lines

Stikas does not disclose the exact method of the breach, citing data sensitivity. However, it is known that some group operators carelessly infected their own computers with malicious code. This opened access for the researcher to command servers, corporate Slack and Discord channels, as well as approximately 5 terabytes of data. By analyzing developer keys, source code, and digital traces, he compiled a detailed list of victims and contacted representatives of the affected organizations.

Among the disclosed targets are Boston Children's Hospital, Japanese technology company AEON Smart Technology, smartphone manufacturer Oppo, as well as crypto exchanges Coinbase and Uniswap Labs. Even the High Council of Justice of Italy and government structures of Flanders made the list. The victims' reactions varied: Flemish authorities isolated workstations and changed passwords, the hospital reported infection of a contractor's personal device, and Coinbase terminated the contractor's contract within 30 days. Many organizations, however, simply ignored the warnings.

Fake job postings and the hunt for crypto fortunes

The method of infiltration was the same in all cases: developers were offered a high-paying position, then asked to download a test assignment containing malicious code. This tactic, known as Contagious Interview, has been used by North Korean groups since 2022. External contractors pose a particular danger, as they often have access to the infrastructure of dozens of clients simultaneously. At the same time, the hackers acted selectively: having access to medical data and court registries, they ignored them, focusing exclusively on finding crypto wallets and private keys.

The scale of the operation confirms reports of hundreds of trained operators in the DPRK and thousands of remote IT specialists for whom strict revenue targets have been set. However, the main risk, in my opinion, lies in the silence of the victims. Hundreds of companies, including crypto exchanges, have not responded to the warnings, and the list of affected parties continues to grow. This is not just a hacker attack—it is a systemic threat to the entire crypto industry, where supply chain security remains the Achilles' heel. Ignoring such signals is not merely negligence but a direct financial time bomb for any business dealing with digital assets.