The entire crypto community's attention is focused on the upcoming BIP-110 soft fork, but not everyone realizes the real threat it poses to holders of digital gold. This is not just a technical update—it is a potential trap capable of stripping users of their actual assets.
The mechanics of the double balance and the attack vector
When a blockchain splits, a situation of double balance arises: the same amount of funds is simultaneously reflected in both chains. It is precisely this feature that, according to my in-depth analysis, attackers could turn into a weapon. At an early stage, transactions are valid in both versions of the network. By signing a transfer of fork tokens, the seller inadvertently provides the buyer with a ready-made template for an identical operation on the main chain.
The attack's mechanics are frighteningly elegant: an equivalent amount is debited from the same address, but already in real bitcoins, and fees are charged twice. At the same time, the wallet is not zeroed out—exactly the volume that was offered for sale is lost. The first to be hit, in all likelihood, will be large holders, whose operations are most attractive to hackers.
Why protection is absent
It is critically important to understand: the BIP-110 specification contains no mechanism to protect against the transfer of transactions between chains, which was forcibly built into the network after the Bitcoin Cash hard fork in 2017. This makes the current situation uniquely dangerous.
The only reliable strategy right now is to keep assets stationary. To copy a transaction, a signed operation is required, and if there is none, there is nothing to reproduce. Any movement of funds during a period of uncertainty is a voluntary provision of the keys to one's wallet.
Technical details and timeline
The dispute has been ongoing since the fall of 2025, when Bitcoin Core v30 developers raised the OP_RETURN field limit from 80 to 100,000 bytes. In response, the Bitcoin Knots team proposed BIP-110, limiting the volume of non-payment data for a year. For standard activation, the initiative must be confirmed by 1109 out of 2016 blocks—currently only about 2.6% of blocks carry the flag.
However, the authors provided an alternative scenario: starting from block #961,632, expected on August 8, nodes with BIP-110 will begin rejecting blocks without the required flag. Since almost the entire hash rate does not set it, these nodes will stop following the main chain. By itself, this will not create a new blockchain—miners ready to mine blocks under the proposal's rules are needed for a split. Restrictions on non-payment data will take effect later, from block #965,664, expected in early September.
Until that moment, both networks will be able to accept the same operations. To safely separate assets, the owner will first have to obtain coins that exist only in one branch, and only then use them to separate one balance from another. The speed of block mining could shift both dates by about a day in either direction.
My verdict: BIP-110 is not just a technical dispute about spam, but a serious existential risk for bitcoin holders. In conditions where protection against replay attacks is absent, any attempt to "sell an airdrop" could result in the loss of real funds. I recommend that all market participants exercise maximum caution and refrain from any operations with fork tokens until the situation fully stabilizes.