Blockchain engineer Kevin Loak is raising the alarm: the upcoming BIP-110 soft fork creates fertile ground for attacks on bitcoin holders. Attempting to sell coins obtained as a result of the network split could result in the loss of real BTC. This is not just a technical detail—it is a serious challenge to the security of the entire ecosystem.
The essence of the problem is this: when the blockchain splits, a double balance arises. The same amount of assets simultaneously exists in both chains. Attackers can exploit this ambiguity to buy tokens of the new network with real bitcoins.
At the initial stage, transactions are valid in both versions of the network. When a user signs a transfer of fork tokens, they inadvertently create a template for a similar operation in the main network. An attacker can copy this signature and carry out an identical transaction, debiting an equivalent amount in real BTC from the same address. Fees are deducted twice in this case, and the wallet is not zeroed out—exactly the amount declared for sale is lost.
Large holders are especially vulnerable. The only reliable strategy in this situation is complete asset inactivity. Without a signed transaction, there is nothing for the attacker to copy, and the attack becomes impossible.
It is important to note that a similar incident has already occurred in bitcoin's history. After the Bitcoin Cash split in 2017, developers had to build a special mechanism into the new network to protect against transferring transactions between chains. The BIP-110 specification has no such protection.
The Root of the Conflict
The dispute over BIP-110 has been ongoing since the fall of 2025. At that time, developers released Bitcoin Core v30, raising the OP_RETURN field limit from 80 to 100,000 bytes. Critics believed this would make it easier to clog the blockchain with extraneous information. In response, Bitcoin Knots proposed BIP-110, which limits the volume of non-payment data for a year.
For standard activation, the initiative must be supported by 1109 out of 2016 blocks. Currently, only about 2.6% of blocks contain the BIP-110 flag. However, the authors also provided an alternative scenario: starting from block #961,632, expected on August 8, nodes with BIP-110 will begin rejecting blocks without the flag. Since almost the entire hash rate does not set it, these nodes will stop following the main chain.
But this alone will not create a new blockchain. A split requires miners willing to mine blocks according to the proposal's rules. If none are found, the alternative chain will not emerge. Restrictions on non-payment data will take effect later—starting from block #965,664, expected in early September.
Until that moment, both networks will be able to accept the same operations. To safely separate assets, the owner will first have to obtain coins that exist only in one branch, and only then use them to separate one balance from the other.
The block mining speed could shift both dates by approximately a day in either direction.
My analysis: The situation around BIP-110 is a classic example of how technical disputes within the community can create real financial risks. I recommend that all bitcoin holders refrain from any operations between August 8 and early September, especially if they plan to interact with fork tokens. Asset security should be a priority, even if it means a temporary loss of liquidity.