Blockchain engineer Kevin Loak is raising the alarm: the upcoming network split due to the activation of BIP-110 creates a dangerous vulnerability that could strip holders of their real bitcoins. This is not a hypothetical threat, but a concrete attack vector that will become possible in the coming days.
The essence of the problem lies in a double balance. During a fork, the same volume of assets will simultaneously exist in two chains. Attackers can exploit this to buy tokens of the new network with real bitcoins. At an early stage, transactions are valid in both versions of the blockchain. By signing a transfer of fork tokens, the seller effectively hands the buyer a ready-made template for an identical operation on the main network.
The outcome is predictable: an equivalent amount is debited from the same address, but in real bitcoins, and fees are charged twice. Moreover, the wallet is not zeroed out—exactly the volume that was offered for sale is lost. In my estimation, large holders, whose operations are most attractive to attackers, will be the first to come under fire.
The only reliable strategy
Loak emphasizes: the only way to avoid disaster is to keep assets stationary. Copying a transaction requires a signed operation, and if there is none, there is nothing to reproduce. This is a harsh but effective rule during the fork.
History already knows a similar precedent. After the Bitcoin Cash split in 2017, developers had to build a special mechanism into the new network to prevent the transfer of transactions between chains. The BIP-110 specification lacks such protection, making the situation especially dangerous.
Why the network ended up on the brink of a split
The conflict had been brewing since the fall of 2025, when developers released Bitcoin Core v30 and raised the OP_RETURN field limit from 80 to 100,000 bytes. Critics saw this as simplifying the placement of extraneous information in the blockchain. In December, the Bitcoin Knots team proposed BIP-110, which limits the volume of non-payment data for a year.
For standard activation, the initiative must be confirmed by 1109 out of 2016 blocks. Currently, about 2.6% of blocks contain the BIP-110 flag. However, the authors provided an alternative scenario: starting from block #961,632, expected on August 8, nodes with BIP-110 will begin rejecting blocks without the required flag. Since almost the entire hash rate does not set it, these nodes will stop following the main chain.
By itself, this will not create a new blockchain. A split requires miners who will continue mining blocks according to the proposal's rules. If none are found, the alternative chain will not emerge. The BIP-110 restrictions on non-payment data will take effect later—from block #965,664, expected in early September. Until that moment, both networks will be able to accept the same operations.
To safely separate assets, the owner will first have to obtain coins that exist only in one branch, and only then use them to separate one balance from another. The speed of block mining could shift both dates by roughly a day in either direction.
My analysis: This situation is a classic example of how technical disputes over scalability turn into real financial risks for users. I recommend that anyone holding bitcoins on hot wallets refrain from any transactions between August 8 and the activation of the restrictions. Cold storage and complete immobility of assets are the only guarantee of safety in times of uncertainty.