An analysis of recent trends in cybercrime shows that North Korean operators have radically changed their approach to laundering stolen digital assets. Instead of building isolated infrastructure, Pyongyang is now actively integrating into existing criminal financial ecosystems, which dramatically complicates the tracking and blocking of funds.
This involves a comprehensive scheme that includes over-the-counter (OTC) platforms, P2P traders, illegal exchanges, mixers, cross-chain bridges, and, notably, platforms linked to fraudulent schemes. Based on monitoring data, my estimates indicate that from January 2024 to September 2025, North Korea managed to steal at least $2.8 billion in virtual assets. These funds directly fuel the weapons of mass destruction program, making the issue not just economic but a matter of global security.
The key role of criminal intermediaries
The most alarming aspect is the stage of converting cryptocurrency into fiat, which is far less studied than on-chain transactions. After the initial movement of funds, the North Korean side transfers assets to third-party launderers. A striking example is the $1.5 billion Bybit exchange hack in February 2025. The "whitening" process involved a sprawling network of OTC and P2P traders, many based in China. These intermediaries worked around the clock, and by September 2025, according to international monitoring groups, all stolen funds had been fully cashed out. The cryptocurrency passed through dozens of addresses and several blockchains, completely obscuring the trail.
Scams as part of the infrastructure
Of particular interest is the connection between North Korean money and the crypto scam industry. I am observing signs of mixing North Korean funds with proceeds from "pig butchering" scams—investment schemes where victims are first groomed and then persuaded to invest in fictitious projects. So-called guarantee marketplaces play a key role here—underground Telegram platforms, predominantly in Chinese. They offer laundering services, technical tools, and escrow intermediation. For example, part of the funds after the WazirX attack was consolidated on TRON and transferred to addresses linked to Xinbi Guarantee and the now-defunct Huione Guarantee. This allows cryptocurrency to be exchanged for cash outside traditional banking oversight.
Fragmenting and P2P networks
Another element of the scheme is fragmenting large sums. Instead of withdrawing millions through a single platform, funds are split into numerous small transactions. I am observing how North Korean operators sell stablecoins through P2P marketplaces in batches of approximately $7,000, which helps evade AML monitoring. Other sources record fragmentation down to $30,000 to ensure that any potential freeze affects only a minor portion of assets. To speed up the process, pre-prepared wallets with automatic fund distribution are used. The endpoints are P2P platforms in South Asia and unregulated exchanges in Latin America.
Ultimately, after several stages, North Korean funds become nearly indistinguishable from other criminal cryptocurrency. This creates a colossal problem for exchanges: establishing a link to the original attack is almost impossible. My conclusion: the main feature of the North Korean model is not the existence of a "secret" channel, but the ability to parasitize on others' infrastructure. These are not just hackers, but a state machine that has turned laundering into an industry, using global scam networks as cover. For the industry, this means that combating WMD financing requires not only on-chain analytics but also a deep understanding of shadow P2P ecosystems.